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ARTICLE
IMPRISONING THE INNOCENT: THE “KNOWLEDGE OF
LAW” FICTION
Phillip D. Kline†
I. THE PRESENT PROBLEM OF PUNISHING THE MORALLY INNOCENT
Disorientation alarmed him. Ocie Mills was accustomed to deciding his
direction and defining his purpose. But today, Monday, May 15, 1989, Ocie
and his son Cary were reporting to prison, adjudged felons by the country
they loved.1
***
Tension between individual liberty and the state, and the inherent
metaphysical mysteries of that tension,2 are at least as old as humankind’s
earliest discovered written stories. In The Epic of Gilgamesh, written from
circa. 2150-1400 BC and considered the most ancient example of literature,
† B.A. Central Missouri State University (1982); J.D., University of Kansas (1987).
Phill Kline is an Associate Professor at Liberty University School of Law where he teaches
Evidence, Bioethics and Law and Trial Practice. He served as a member of the Kansas House
of Representatives (1993-2001), Kansas Attorney General (2003-2007) and Johnson County
District Attorney (2007-2009). He thanks several of his colleagues at Liberty University for
vigorous discussions honing and challenging Mr. Kline’s thoughts. Specifically, he thanks
Professors Rodney Chrisman, Tory Lucas, Joseph Martins, Stephen Rice, Michael Sandez,
Paul Spinden and Jeffrey Tuomala for their input. Mr. Kline also thanks his research
assistants Jessica Stanton, Jonathan Shbeeb and Micah Long for their efforts and also the
numerous other students with whom he also discussed this topic and whose challenges
helped his understanding. He also expresses his thanks to faculty secretary Katherine
Shaibani for her assistance. Mr. Kline wishes the reader to know, any errors are his.
1. James J. Drummey, This Land is My Land – Isn’t It?, NEW AM. (June 19, 1989)
[hereinafter This Land], https://www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/constitution/item/18055-thisland-is-my-land-isnt-it; Author’s Interview with Cary Mills, recorded with permission (September
27, 2017) [hereinafter Author’s Interview].
2. I propose one source of our current difficulty in assessing the proper scope and
meaning of the Eighth Amendment and to punish justly is an unwillingness to acknowledge
foundational truths and their implications while acknowledging that due to human fallibility
the procedural protections provided in our Constitution and the equal protection clause fail
to adequately forward those truths. This failure is partially due to our refusal to speak in the
language of faith, or metaphysics, dismissing intuition, refusing to acknowledge the
aspirational nature of the Constitution and a failure to recognize the presuppositions present
in all language. See infra pp. 59-71.
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the Sumerian gods created Enkidu and tasked him to curb the harsh rule of
the demi-god Gilgamesh, the King of Uruk.3
History and literature are consistent with this topic, revealing the danger
of state tyranny against man, not the individual’s tyranny against the state.
And the same danger is present today. In our nation, founded on the
promise of individual liberty, procedural protections of liberty are failing as
the state assumes far greater jurisdictional authority over the lives of its
citizens. The symptoms are limited, but the beginnings of disease often are.
It is the loss of principle that is monumental and which will allow the
symptoms to grow in number and strength.
***
Ocie’s wife maneuvered their car silently onto the Escambia Bay Bridge,
which was embraced by Pensacola, Florida’s morning fog. Likewise, Ocie
shrouded his thoughts as he glanced towards his son Cary, 31. Their eyes
met. No words were spoken.
Keith Onsdorff, an attorney for the United States Environmental
Protection Agency, had much to say about Ocie and Cary’s prison sentence.
He trumpeted to assembled media that the EPA was “truly gratified” for the
prison term so that “a strong message” would be sent to other polluters of
the nation’s “navigable waterways.”4
The Millses were found guilty of five counts of discharging pollutants
into the waters of the United States without a permit, “in violation of
Sections 301(a) and 309(c) [of] the Clean Water Act, Title 33, United States
Code, Sections 1311(a) and 1319(c).”5

3. The Epic of Gilgamesh is considered as one of humankind’s earliest written stories.
Gilgamesh is now considered an historical figure who ruled Uruk in southern Mesopotamia
circa 2100 B.C. In the Epic, the citizens of Uruk suffer under Gilgamesh’s harsh rule,
enslaving his subjects to forward his interests. See generally Gilgamesh, ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Gilgamesh (last visited Feb. 2, 2018); Epic of
Gilgamesh,
ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Epic-ofGilgamesh (last visited Feb. 2, 2018). Most historians consider Gilgamesh as a semi-mythic
historical figure who is “widely accepted” as the 5th King of Uruk. See Joshua J. Mark,
Gilgamesh, ANCIENT HIST. ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://www.ancient.eu/gilgamesh/ (last visited
Feb. 2, 2018).
4. Author’s Interview, supra note 1; see also This Land, supra note 1.
5. United States v. Mills, 817 F. Supp. 1546, 1548 (N.D. Fla. 1993).
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***
Deterrence, or punishing to warn others, has long been recognized as a
legitimate goal of punishment. Blackstone identified the specific deterrence
of the offender and the general deterrence of the public as the primary
purposes of punishment,6 proclaiming punishment is inflicted, not as a
means of expiation or atonement, but “as a precaution against future
offense of the same kind . . . or by deterring others by the dread of his
example.”7
Yet Blackstone, as protective of “public safety” as a utilitarian can be,
would recoil at the treatment of Ocie Mills.8 Much as Federal District Court
Judge Roger Vinson did when criticizing the government’s claim that Ocie
Mills committed a “knowing” violation of law. The government employed
“a reversal of terms that is worthy of Alice in Wonderland” to accomplish
their objective, Vinson explained.9
He then took aim at “the regulatory hydra which emerged from the
Clean Water Act” that sent a man and his son to prison for “plac[ing] clean
fill dirt on dry land” that they owned while claiming the father and son
“discharge[ed] pollut[ants] the navigable waters of the United States.”10
The dry land, which the Corps of Engineers construed as a wetland, was
located at the head of East Bay in Pensacola and consisted of two lots on
which Cary hoped to build his dream home.11 But, before building, father

6. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *11 (republished in 2 SIR WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND IN FOUR BOOKS (George Sharswood,
ed. 1893),
http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/blackstone-commentaries-on-the-laws-ofengland-in-four-books-vol-2 (last visited Feb. 2, 2018)). I join others in disagreeing with
Blackstone on this point and argue that unlimited consequentialist penological purposes
offend the dignity of individuals by using the individual as a means, rather than recognizing
them as an end. See infra pp. 23-71; see also Mark 2:28.
7. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *11. Retributive punishment serves the
ends of justice and properly sets the stage for the re-establishment of right relationship, or
righteousness, recognizing the wrong committed and thereby recognizing the victim and the
offender’s intrinsic worth. Utilitarian aims, however, use individuals as a means and offends
human dignity. See generally Gary V. Dubin, Mens Rea Reconsidered: A Plea for a Due
Process Concept of Criminal Responsibility, 18 STAN. L. REV. 322, 337 (1966); Jeffrey C.
Tuomala, Christ’s Atonement as the Model for Civil Justice, 38 AM. J. JURIS. 221 (1993).
8. I argue that Blackstone would naturally apply retributive proportionality as a limit to
consequentialist aims despite his “Toryism” in affirming the supreme power of Parliament.
See Albert W. Alschuler, Rediscovering Blackstone, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 4-19 (1996).
9. Mills, 817 F. Supp. at 1547.
10. Id. at 1547 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1)).
11. Author’s interview, supra note 1.
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and son decided to repair and stabilize an old drainage ditch and use clean
sand as fill on the lots. For this, they would pay a dear price.
***
America, today, always wants someone else to pay. Fueled by media
amplification of the politics of fear and false hope, the nation demands
quick fixes to perplexing problems. The nation is even slowly converting
feelings of well-being into positive rights to be protected by institutions and
government.12
It is not surprising, then, in this environment of hyper self-interest,
where media catapults local issues into national concerns and elected
officials convert concerns to fears, that considerations of the accused and
criminals are marginalized. Those exercising political power do not identify
with the isolated, forgotten, and different. Ironically, the demand for simple
solutions born in self-interest is spawning a loss of freedom and increasing
the growing tendency of the state to diminish the individual.
Yet, such passions were not unknown or unforeseen at our nation’s
founding. In England, contemporaneous with the American Revolution and
the adoption of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against “cruel and
unusual punishments,”13 Parliament had authorized the death penalty for
more than 200 crimes.14 Blackstone lamented that Parliament, through
indifference and answering “the passions or interests of a few,” had “too
hastily employ[ed] such means as are greatly disproportionate to their end”
by imposing a death sentence on those who broke down “the mound of a
fishpond, whereby any fish shall escape; or [who] cut down a cherry-tree in

12. College campuses are implementing “safe spaces” where students can be shielded
form dissenting viewpoints, creating tension with First Amendment principles. See,
e.g.,“‘Safe Spaces’ on college campuses run at odds with First Amendment, say law experts, FOX
NEWS (November 14, 2015), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2015/11/13/safe-spaces-oncollege-campuses-unconstitional-say-law-experts.html. In Canada, the Canadian Law
Society of Upper Canada, the official licensing agency for lawyers in Ontario, is compelling
lawyers, at the threat of losing their license, to prepare “a statement of principles” consistent
with guidelines promulgated by the society. Government compelled speech is one symptom
of converting that previously considered a negative right or an issue of expressing respect
into a positive right to be enforced by government. See Bruce Pardy, Canadian Law Society’s
new policy compels speech, crosses line that must not by crossed. NAT’L POST (Oct. 3, 2017),
https://www.sott.net/article/363588-Canadian-Law-Societys-new-policy-compels-speechcrosses-line-that-must-not-be-crossed.
13. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
14. See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 289 (1976).
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an orchard . . . [as well as] those “seen for one month in the company of
persons who call themselves, or are called, Egyptians.”15
Limiting such undisciplined passions was a primary aim of the drafters of
the Eighth Amendment. “Your men who go to Congress are not restrained
by a bill of rights,” warned Patrick Henry at the Virginia Ratifying
Convention for the Constitution in 1788. Without a Bill of Rights and the
Eighth Amendment, Henry pointed out, Congressmen “are not restrained
from inflicting unusual and severe punishments . . . . What will be the
consequence? They may inflict the most cruel and ignominious
punishments.”16 “We are told [by those opposing a Bill of Rights that] we
are afraid to trust ourselves; that our own representatives—Congress—will
not exercise their powers oppressively; that we shall not enslave ourselves . .
. . Who has enslaved France, Spain, Germany, Turkey, and other countries
which groan under tyranny? They have been enslaved by the hands of their
own people. If it will be so in America, it will be only as it has been every
where else.”17
Henry prevailed, and Virginia refused to ratify the Constitution, unless a
Bill of Rights, including a prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishments, was attached.
Two-hundred and twelve years later, in Bayou la Batre, Alabama, 927
miles southwest of the site of Henry’s speech but within the modern
boundaries of the nation he helped found, agents of the National Marine
Fisheries Service raided the business of Abner Schoenwetter, obtaining
evidence that sent Schoenwetter to federal prison for six years.
Schoenwetter improperly packed his imported lobsters in plastic, rather
than cardboard,18 violating the Lacy Act which requires U.S. citizens to
comply with all foreign laws and regulations.19 Honduras, the source of
Schoenwetter’s lobsters, through a regulation later ruled invalid by the
Honduran high court, prohibited shipping lobsters in plastic.20

15. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *4.
16. 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION IN PHILADELPHIA,
IN 1787 at 411 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836) [hereinafter Debates].
17. Id. at 412.
18. See United States v. McNab, 331 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2003).
19. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371 et. seq. (1900).
20. McNab, 331 F.3d at 12. Later, the Honduran Supreme Court ruled that packing
regulation violated by Schoenwetter was invalid. This ruling, however, did not save
Schoenwetter from this conviction or serving time in prison. See Rough Justice, THE
ECONOMIST (July 22, 2010) http://www.economist.com/node/16640389?story_id=16640389.
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In 2014, 724 miles southeast of Schoenwetter’s arrest, ninety-year-old
World War II veteran and pastor, Arnold Abbott was arrested and faced
sixty days in jail for feeding the homeless in Fort Lauderdale, running afoul
of a regulation requiring permits and the provision of a “porta-potty.”21
Abbot figured providing the porta-potty was the city’s job.
And citizens in every state are here warned that a criminal record, a fine,
and six months in prison await those who “reproduce, or use” the character
Woodsy the Owl or his slogan, “Give a Hoot, Don’t Pollute,” without
permission of the United States government.22
A. The Erosion of Mens Rea through the Expanding Breadth and Number of
“Public Welfare Crimes” and Weak Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence
Combine to Place the Innocent in Jeopardy.
1. Ignorance of that which is Unknowable can Land You in Prison.
“[W]e have assumed a tendency to federalize ‘everything that walks,
talks, and moves’ . . . [and now] hoots,” observed Justice Neil Gorsuch when
speaking to the Federalist Society in 2013.23
Federalization and criminalization are so prevalent that we are unable to
count the number of federal crimes.24 They’re too numerous and are hidden
in a byzantine regulatory structure. The federal penal code “spread[s] across
. . . fifty-one titles and 27,000 pages” containing more than 4,000 federal
crimes.25 Additionally, estimates are that there are more than 300,000
federal regulatory crimes and perhaps as many, or more, state crimes.26
21. See, e.g., Jordan Richardson, Pastor Charged with Criminal Penalty for Feeding the
Homeless, THE DAILY SIGNAL (November 6, 2014), http://dailysignal.com/2014/11/06/pastorcharged-criminal-penalty-feeding-homeless/.
22. 18 U.S.C. § 711a (1994).
23. Judge Neil Gorsuch on Overcriminalization, RIGHT ON CRIME (Nov. 18, 2013),
http://rightoncrime.com/2013/11/judge-neil-gorsuch-on-overcriminalization/.
Gorsuch
then served on the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals and assumed his position on the Supreme
Court on April 8, 2017. Neil Gorsuch, OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/justices/neil_gorsuch (last
visited Feb. 2, 2018).
24. There are more than 4,000 crimes in the federal criminal code. The remaining
crimes are detailed in federal regulatory reports. The Congressional Research Service has
been unable to tally the number of such crimes. See, e.g., Overcriminalization, RIGHT ON
CRIME, http://rightoncrime.com/category/priority-issues/overcriminalization/ (last visited
Feb. 2, 2018).
25. Edwin Meese, III & Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Reconsidering the Mistake of Law Defense, 102
J. CRIM. L. AND CRIMINOLOGY 725, 739 (2012) [hereinafter Reconsidering].
26. Id. at 740. Federal courts lack common law jurisdiction and so all federal crimes must be
statutory. See United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812). So, counting
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Today, more than one-third of America’s workers face regulatory oversight
through licensure, “almost seven times higher than it was just fifty years ago
[and is] almost as common for workers in the United States as
goldbricking.”27 This assessment does not include the impact of the
regulation of worker conduct.
Yet, ignorantia juris non excusat28 is still considered a legal maxim.
And lawyers and serious thinkers scoff.
Claiming knowledge of the content and scope of these laws is just as
beyond our reach as Caligula’s laws were beyond the vision of his subjects.29
“[N]otoriously and ridiculously false,”30 writes John Austin, regarding the
claim. As British Parliamentarian Sir John Foster of Northwich wryly
federal crimes should be a straight forward proposition. It isn’t. “So large is the present body of
federal criminal law that there is not conveniently accessible, complete list of federal crimes.” Task
Force on Federalization of Criminal Law, American Bar Association, THE FEDERALIZATION OF
CRIM. L. 9 (1998) [hereinafter Federalization Report]. In 2008 Rep. John Sensenbrenner (R-Wis.)
requested the Congressional Research Service to count the number of criminal offenses in the
federal code. The Service response to the Congressman stated that they did not have sufficient
manpower or resources to accomplish the task. See, e.g., Mike Masnick, Overcriminalization:
Congressional Research Service Doesn’t Have The Manpower to List All Federal Crimes, TECHDIRT
(July 19, 2013), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130718/17001523860/overcriminalizationcongressional-research-service-doesnt-have-manpower-to-list-all-federal-crimes.shtml. See also,
Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, Many Failed Efforts to Count Nation’s Criminal Laws, THE
WALL STREET J. (July 23, 2011) (“[T]he hunt [for] an exact number of federal crimes is likely to
prove futile and inaccurate.”) (quoting James Strazzella, author of “The Federalization of Criminal
Law,” a report of the American Bar Association).
27. Paul M. Spinden, The Enigma of Engineering’s Industrial Exemption to Licensure:
The Exception that Swallowed the Profession, 83 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 637, 637 (2015).
“Goldbricking is intentionally wasting time on the job, treating each brick as if it were made
of gold.
28. Ignorance of the law is no excuse.
29. Caligula, Roman emperor from AD 37-41, is known for his cruel and tyrannical
rule. To promote his arbitrary power over his citizens he posted laws he promulgated high
on the pillars of buildings, beyond the vision of his subjects. See Janine Turner, The infamous
Roman Emperor Caligula and the U.S. Congress, THE WASH. TIMES (October 1, 2015),
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/oct/1/janine-turner-the-infamous-romanemperor-caligula-/; see also Timothy Lynch, Polluting Our Principles: Environmental
Prosecutions and the Bill of Rights, in GO DIRECTLY TO JAIL: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF ALMOST
EVERYTHING 45, 48 (Gene Healy, ed., 2004). Publishing laws and promulgations was ancient
practice so that citizens were provided notice so that they could exercise their reason to
conform their conduct to the laws. See, e.g., Exodus 31:18 (God published his Ten
Commandments to Moses); Deuteronomy 27:1-3, 8 (Israel was to write its laws);
Deuteronomy 6:7-8 (Israel was commanded to display its laws); and Exodus 24:7 (the laws
were to be read to the people).
30. 1 JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE OR THE PHILOSOPHY OF POSITIVE LAW
481-82 (Robert Campbell ed., 5th ed. 2005) (1885).
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observed, “Everyone is deemed to know the law except Her Majesty’s judges
who have a Court of Appeal put over them to put them right.”31
***
Ocie Mills’ disorientation became Judge Vinson’s frustration. Two years
later, after the Millses served twenty-one months in prison, Judge Vinson
considered a challenge to the Millses’ conviction. Vinson recognized that a
“general principle” of criminal law requires the law to provide some form of
notice as to the type of conduct prohibited, so that “person[s] of common
intelligence [are] not . . . forced to guess at the potential applicability of a
criminal prohibition to their conduct.”32 Put in a way a five-year-old
protesting his punishment understands, “I didn’t know! It’s unfair!”
This general principle is one of the fastly eroding protections that is
designed to protect the morally innocent from facing punishment.
To Judge Vinson’s scorn, such basic fairness rings hollow in America’s
courts. “I am unable to say,” Judge Vinson continued, “that a person of
common intelligence would be able to ascertain that [the] statutory
prohibition [of the Clean Water Act] applies to clean fill dirt placed onto
[the Millses’] lot . . . .”33
Understandable criminal laws are a primary requisite for justice. “No one
may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the
meaning of penal statutes.”34
Judge Vinson’s comments were prescient and his point was particularly
relevant to the Millses’ case. After serving their prison sentence, the Millses
were placed on “supervisory release” contingent on successfully completing
a “Site Restoration Plan” for the affected former mosquito ditch. The Corps
claimed the Millses failed to comply, filing a motion that they be returned to
prison. Judge Vinson held an “extended evidentiary hearing” and issued his
order rejecting the Corps’ claims on Christmas Eve 1991.
In doing so, Judge Vinson, who did not preside over the criminal trial of
the Millses, also found that at the time of the Millses’ conviction, “the

31. 739 Parl Deb HC (5th ser.) (1967) col. 1941 (UK) (quoting British Solicitor Mr.
Vachell “a great Oxford” solicitor and his remarks to a jury).
32. United States v. Mills, 817 F. Supp. 1546, 1554 (N.D. Fla. 1993).
33. Id.
34. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939); see also Paul J. Larkin, Jr., The Folly
of Requiring Complete Knowledge of the Criminal Law, 12 LIBERTY U. L. REV. ___
(forthcoming 2018) [hereinafter Folly].
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subject land . . . was probably not a ‘wetland’ for purposes of the [C]lean
Water Act.”35
Accordingly, concluded Vinson, the Millses went to prison for
“polluting” dry land, which—over a period of years—two federal judges and
two governmental environmental agencies could not agree constituted
“wetlands.”36
Yet, Judge Vinson’s sensible inclinations were constrained by nonsensible37 decisions of the United States Supreme Court that left full
discretion with the Corp of Engineers to “flesh out the statute to cover
wetlands,” just as the Court does with Congress and scores of other federal
agencies. All Vinson could do was to write a judicial protest in the form of
an opinion. His words, however, did not reduce the time Ocie and Cary
Mills spent in prison nor remove their status as felons.

35. Mills, 817 F. Supp. at 1548.
36. In addition to the Corps of Engineers, the Millses were in contact with Florida
environmental agencies who advised them their land did not include any wetlands. This
evidence was also precluded by the trial judge, the retired Judge. See Daniel Drew, A
Criminal Conviction that Doesn’t Hold Water, THE DAILY SIGNAL, (June 17, 2013),
http://dailysignal.com/2013/06/17/a-criminal-conviction-that-doesnt-hold-water/.
37. Professor Steven D. Smith explains that court decisions invoke mere words, or nonsense, when the decisions “employ[] notions that cannot be accounted for in terms of the
ontological inventory that the speaker . . . [is] using.” STEVEN D. SMITH, LAW’S QUANDARY 36
(2007) [hereinafter QUANDARY]. Knowledge of the law is only relevant to a determination of
guilt if the accused’s intent is part of the definition of guilt. This, inherently, is a moral
consideration as it pertains to what the accused “should” or “ought” to have done or not
done. This is a metaphysical question and does not abide in the original frame of legal
positivism. The Supreme Court’s deference to a broad delegation of legislative authority as it
applies to persons unaware of the reach of the law is unjust, which is itself a metaphysical
question. Yet, I acknowledge the Court’s deference may be its abiding by constitutional
principles such as the separation of powers. Nevertheless, the result is non-sense according
to Smith, because America’s philosophical culture today rejects metaphysics. Otherwise,
punishing the innocent in the cause of justice is not “nonsense,” but merely hypocrisy.
Interestingly, even the terms sensible – that which can be measured by the senses; and
nonsense – that which cannot be measured by the senses, demonstrate our cultural bias for
materialism and scientism. Hypocrisy is revealed in all human efforts to reduce the human
individual to a means, rather than end. For in the end, these humans are but individuals.
This is seen in the evolution of theories of punishment where consequentialist penological
aims are left without limits – “hypocrisy has taken the place of legitimation.” Markus Dirk
Dubber, The Right to be Punished: Autonomy and Its Demise in Modern Penal Thought, 16
LAW & HIST. REV. 113, 116 (1998). See also infra p. 59-71.
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***
The Millsess, as in life, walked together through the gates of Saufley Field
Federal Prison Camp and within moments were separated and strip
searched.38 Later that night, separated from his son, Ocie Mills, a proud and
strong man, quietly sobbed, praying his son would understand and forgive
him.39
***
Judge Vinson lamented that he “must apply the law as it exists, and
cannot change it.”40 But he accompanied his lament with a warning and an
invitation.
“A jurisprudence which allows Congress to impliedly delegate its
criminal lawmaking authority to a regulatory agency . . . so long as Congress
provides an ‘intelligible principle’ . . . calls into question the vitality of the
tripartite system”41 and also “calls into question the nexus that must exist
between the law so applied and simple logic and common sense,” he wrote.
Opining that the Supreme Court likely didn’t realize its decisions permitted
the unleashing of the creative energies of the modern regulatory state,42
Vinson observed that any reigning in of modern public welfare criminal
liability must start at a different “level,” with the Supreme Court.43
2. Erosion of the Mens Rea Doctrine Accelerated the Modern
Regulatory State.
Distinguishing between “morally blameworthy” and “morally innocent”
requires the actor to be rational and knowing so that an intent to act is
present at the time of the proscribed conduct. These metaphysical
presumptions manifest in the traditional requirement of mens rea before
conduct is considered criminal. Judge Vinson’s apprehension, that judicial
deference to the legislative delegation powers gives rise to potential notice
and due process violations, is truly the expression of one overriding
concern—that an innocent person might be punished.44
38. Author’s Interview, supra note 1.
39. Id.
40. Mills, 817 F. Supp. at 1555.
41. Id. at 1555.
42. See id. at 1554.
43. Id. at 1555.
44. The founders did not express themselves in the language of current constitutional
jurisprudence. Rather, they placed procedural protections of individual liberty in the
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The primary bulwark preventing his result is the longstanding demand
that the state prove intent in order to convict an individual of a crime.
“An involuntary act, as it has no claim to merit, so neither can it induce
any guilt: the concurrence of the will, when it has its choice either to do or
to avoid the fact in question, being the only thing that renders human
actions either praiseworthy or culpable. Indeed, to make a complete crime
cognizable by human laws, there must be both a will and an act,” 45
explained Blackstone in his Commentaries, published within a decade of the
American Revolution. 46
In the eighteenth-century “the criminal law took seriously the
requirement that a defendant . . . [have] acted in a malicious and malevolent
way” prior to a criminal conviction.47
And, as late as the early twentieth-century, prominent legal scholars did
not believe the United States would broadly eliminate mens rea resulting in
imprisonment. “Criminality is and always will be based upon a requisite
state of mind as one of its prime factors,” wrote the Dean of Harvard Law
School, Francis Bowes Sayre.48
The mens rea doctrine began suffering severe erosion in the early
twentieth-century with the advent of strict liability “public welfare crimes,”
a legislatively created and judicially recognized exception to the mean rea
doctrine. Legislative proponents claimed strict liability was necessary to
address significant potential societal harms arising from an increasingly
complex society in circumstances where proof of guilty knowledge was
difficult. In such circumstances, judicial deference was offered partially due
to the insignificance of the criminal penalties attached to such crimes.49
This evolution has greatly narrowed the Court’s mens rea inquiry to
whether “the defendant’s conduct express the specific mental
Constitution alongside aspirational language so that those protections and principles would
live beyond their times. See infra p. 15. Much of the language articulating those protections
and aspirations were placed in the Constitution to prevent the punishment of morally
innocent individuals.
45. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *21.
46. Id. at *21-22.
47. Richard Singer & Douglas Husak, Of Innocence and Innocents: The Supreme Court
and Mens Rea Since Herbert Packer, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 859, 860 (1999).
48. Francis Bowes Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUMBIA L. REV. 55, 55 (1933). In
confession, I am a former Republican legislator, state Attorney General and modern
conservative who is calling for the judiciary to reign in Congress’s aimless and arbitrary
creation of new strict liability crimes that are accompanied by a loss of liberty. I believe,
however, this concern and its recommended actions are consistent with the principles that
motivated my initial involvement in government service.
49. See generally id. at 59-62.
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state . . . required by the statute,”50 thus converting a “fundamental principle
of justice”51 into an issue of statutory interpretation.
The claimed necessity for strict liability crimes, however, has been
overstated, and the penalties are no longer minor, causing increasing
discomfort in the Supreme Court.
Recently, the Court has shown greater vigor in finding, or inferring,
mens rea in its statutory interpretation, but has not quite elevated mens rea
to a constitutional principle, “except sometimes.”52 The Court seems unable
to extricate itself from a deep philosophical conflict and its institutional
respect for its conflicting prior decisions.53 The result is judicial muddle.54
I join a long list of commentators calling for the jettisoning of the general
prohibition of the mistake or ignorance of law defense.55 The doctrine was a
mistake at its beginning56 and is a harmful judicial fiction today57 that allows
the morally innocent to suffer in prison.
50. Singer & Husak, supra note 46, at 860.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 859 (quoting Herbert L. Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 SUP.
CT. REV. 107). See also Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952); Cheek v. United
States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991); Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994); Liparota v. United
States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985); Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994); Rosemond v.
United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240 (2014); McFadden v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2298 (2015);
Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015); cf. United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922);
United States v. Dotterwich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943); United States v. Int’l Minerals & Chem.
Corp., 402 U.S. 558 (1971); United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971); and United States v.
Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
53. See infra. at Section III.
54. Some claim the Court’s recent decisions reflect an increased respect for mens rea
and “reinvigorate[] its concern with protecting innocent persons as a bedrock of federal
criminal law.” Singer & Husak, supra note 46, at 861. Others strongly disagree. See Louis
Bilionis, Process: The Constitution and Substantive Criminal Law, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1269,
1278-79 (1998).
55. See, e.g., Folly, supra note 33, at 41-42; Reconsidering, supra note 24, at 729; see also
infra at 77-79.
56. Error juris nocet, error facti non nocet, that a person must suffer from his mistakes at
law but not his mistakes in fact, is found in Blackstone’s interpretations of the Digests. Yet
Blackstone was in error. The doctrine was “never applied by the Romans to the field of
criminal law.” Paul K. Ryu & Helen Silving, Error Juris: A Comparative Study, 24 U. CHI. L.
REV. 421, 425 (1957) (citing 3 BINDING, DIE NORMEN UND IHRE UBERTRETUNG 30-79, at 56
(1918)). Blackstone made a linguistic mistake. Id. Yet, when America’s founders were
perpetuating the mistake, the maxim made sense as virtually all criminal law involved clearly
understood morally wrong conduct that harmed others. See Folly, supra note 33, at 1-2. “The
colonies brought the common law of crimes to American soil, and the first federal criminal
statute contained approximately 30 offenses . . . and they were obvious to everyone given
their violent nature . . . or religious underpinnings.” Id.
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These inconsistencies reflect tension between the Court’s desire to defer
to legislative decisions and the recognition that punishing innocent persons
is inherently disproportional to the moral blameworthiness of the
individual. Sentencing an innocent person to prison is a grossly
disproportionate punishment and one is justified in intuiting its
proscription by the Eight Amendment. But, as with mens rea, what appears
clear in logic becomes muddled in application.
3. The Eighth Amendment Currently Fails to Protect Innocent
Persons from Disproportional Punishment.
The Court’s legislative deference in issues of mens rea and interpretation
of the Eighth Amendment are born of flawed compromises of competing
judicial philosophies, and it has eviscerated the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition of “cruel and unusual” punishment, joining with Congress’s
exploitation of the Court’s public welfare crime exception to the traditional
mens rea requirement so that innocent persons face severe punishment.
Although challenging strict liability crimes lies in the Court’s due process
jurisdiction, the Eighth Amendment’s drafters were concerned about preand post-conviction punishment and did not express themselves in the
language of current constitutional jurisprudence. Rather, they placed
procedural protections of individual liberty in the Constitution alongside
aspirational language so that those protections and the principles giving
birth to those protections would live beyond their times.58
“Time works changes . . . . Therefore a principle to be vital must be
capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth. This is
peculiarly true of constitutions . . . enactments . . . ‘designed to approach
immortality as nearly as human institutions can approach it.’”59
Many of the procedural protections of the Constitution are designed to
ensure the morally innocent do not face punishment,60 and state
punishment of the innocent was of grave concern to the drafters.61 In other
words, the framers were purpose-driven.62
57. See infra at 74-77.
58. See infra at 15.
59. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910) (quoting C.J. Marshall).
60. Id.
61. Infra p. 52-56.
62. Strict textualism fails to consider the aspirational qualities, or purposes, of the
founders. As described by Professor Tory Lucas when describing the “texualist and
purposivist legal philosophy” of Judge Henry Friendly “[h]e sought to discover the purpose
or essence of what the law was trying to accomplish. He had a resolute understanding that
legal principles are not independent islands that we visit for resolution of disputes. Instead,
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Contrary to the Orwellian claim that correctional institutions
rehabilitate,63 imprisonment is one of society’s most harsh punishments,
and the application of that punishment to the morally innocent is grossly
disproportional and violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel
and unusual punishment.
The Court should achieve this aim by recognizing the limiting nature of
the retributive justice theory, thereby applying the proportionality principle
of “lex talionis” to all theories of punishment, including consequentialist
objectives. This conforms to the Court’s Eighth Amendment approach to
the drafter’s aims of protecting human dignity and prohibiting the
punishment of the morally innocent.
II. ORGANIZATIONAL AND SUBSTANTIVE SUMMARY – PROCEDURAL DUE
PROCESS PROTECTIONS AND THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT’S PROHIBITION
AGAINST CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT ARE INTENDED TO PROHIBIT
THE PUNISHMENT OF THE MORALLY INNOCENT.
A. Through the Eighth Amendment, America’s Founders Sought to Prohibit
All Punishment Not Justly Deserved.
This Article primarily focuses on the historical origins of mens rea and
its erosion throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This history
is necessary to understand the origins and context of today’s constitutional
protections against unjust state punishment and today’s misunderstandings
of those origins. The writings and motivations of British jurists of the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries do not fit neatly into the analytical
framework of modern jurisprudence.
For example, the United States Supreme Court and its Justices have long
struggled with understanding how the framers could expressly prohibit
“cruel and unusual punishments”64 while contemporaneously, and after the
Constitution’s ratification, colonial governments and England imposed the
barbaric punishments of disembowelment and burning at the stake for
treason.65 The word “cruel,” clearly, did not solely apply to the method of

they form the fabric of our society, and they are only as good as the purposes they serve . . .
[for] all law is driven by a purpose.” Tory L. Lucas, Henry J. Friendly: Designed to Be a Great
Federal Judge, 65 DRAKE L. REV. 421, 441-42 (2017) (citations omitted).
63. See generally Dubber, supra note 36.
64. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
65. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 968 (1991) (citing Granucci, Nor Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Inflicted: The Original Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839, 855-56 (1969)).
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punishment. Consistency is only found in understanding the full context of
the political struggles of the time.
This history reveals the influence of Christian concepts of equality and
the intrinsic value of the individual in the development of mens rea and the
crucial role the concept of “moral” guilt played in the definition of crime
(modern due process questions). The quest to define moral guilt derived
from a concern for justice and for ensuring punishment was justified, and
its derivative concern of restoring the offender to “right relationship,” or
righteousness. The question of when punishment is justified—and what
punishment, when justified, is just—identifies the link between modern
definitional substantive and procedural due process concerns with modern
Eighth Amendment punishment concerns.66
This is made more evident by the British Crown’s use of torture as a
means of proof in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and the
prevailing belief, at that time, in the supremacy of the state. The state often
used punishment and excessive fines, or amercements, to extract unreliable
proof and coerced confessions. This practice, common in civil law on the
European continent and condemned by British common law, was
nevertheless exercised through the Royal prerogative in England and
carried out by the King’s Star Chamber and Court of High Commission.
Although in modern terms, torture as a means of proof raises due
process concerns, British jurists nevertheless viewed and identified torture
as punishment due to doctrines of state supremacy which inherently
justified state punishment or torture, at all times, in all circumstances. This
dual purpose of the Eighth Amendment, to prevent punishment of the
morally innocent and disproportional punishment of the guilty, was once
recognized by the Supreme Court. In addressing the Eighth Amendment,
the Court in 1910 observed, “We cannot think that the possibility of a
coercive cruelty being exercised through other forms of punishment was
overlooked.”67 The Crown’s cruel punishment of the morally innocent
served as a primary motivation to restrict state punishment, and
Parliament’s efforts to do likewise lent motivation to the drafters of the
Eighth Amendment.
British efforts to ensure justice and to prevent cruel or unjust
punishment repeatedly failed in application due to adherence to the state
supremacy doctrines. This failing is mirrored by the present unjust

See also Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 370 (1910) (recognizing that instruments of
“terror, pain [and] disgrace” were present at the nation’s founding).
66. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
67. Weems, 217 U.S. at 373.
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punishment of the morally innocent deriving from the dominant
materialistic jurisprudential deference to legislative empiricist-driven
consequentialist theories of punishment.68
In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, punishing the morally
innocent was called torture, or cruel, or both; although often called contrary
to ancient rights or a violation of the Great Charter, or Magna Carta,
individual rights bowed to the supremacy of the state, whether it be the
King and his “divine right,”69 or Parliament and its Supremacy.70 One can
see the same result today, most often in the judgments of foreign courts that
often hold a punishment as offensive to human dignity and unjust, yet
allowing the punishment to be imposed in deference to the consequentialist
68. See infra at 59-69; see also Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 957. In his concurrence in
Harmelin, Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices O’Connor and Souter, argued otherwise,
concluding that the Eighth Amendment does contain “a narrow proportionality principle”
that applies in sentencing cases. Yet, Justice Kennedy then proceeded to invalidate any
proportionality review. Acknowledging the Court has not been totally “clear or consistent”
Justice Kennedy identifies five “common principles” in the court’s decisions relating to
noncapital Eighth Amendment cases. Three principles Kennedy identifies compel deference
to legislative decisions. Fixing the length of prison sentences “involves a substantial
penological judgment that, as a general matter, is ‘properly within the province of
legislatures, not courts’” Kennedy writes. Moreover, the Eighth Amendment does not
mandate the adoption of a specific penological scheme and accordingly, “marked
divergences . . . in . . . prison terms are . . . inevitable [and] often beneficial.” The Eighth
Amendment, therefore, only prohibits punishments in noncapital cases that are “‘grossly
disproportionate’ to the crime.” Id. at 996-999, 1001 (J. Kennedy, concurring) (citations
omitted). Justice White wrote in his dissent that the proportionality must be as measured by
“objective factors to the maximum possible extent,” such as intrajurisdictional and
interjurisdictional comparisons of sentencing for like crimes and like sentences which reflect
the “evolving standards of decency” of a “maturing society.” This comparison is not
necessary, however, unless “a threshold comparison of the crime committed and the
sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality.” Id. at 1015, 1019 (J.
White, dissenting) (citations omitted). The effort to preserve a proportionality test in
noncapital cases in constitutional review against flawed textualist claims is not justified.
Justices Kennedy and White effectively neutered any meaningful review by untying
proportionality from the retributive theory of justice, a flaw in logic that Justice Scalia was
quick to highlight. “[S]ince there are many . . . justifications for [sentencing, such as
deterrence, rehabilitation, incapacitation and retribution] . . . . the penalties for [like crimes]
would not necessarily be comparable,” Scalia explains. “In fact, it becomes difficult even to
speak intelligently of ‘proportionality,’ once deterrence and rehabilitation are given
significant weight. Proportionality is inherently a retributive concept, and perfect
proportionality is the talionic law.” Id. at 989 (majority opinion).
69. Fully expressed by King James I and articled by Hume in the LEVIATHAN. See infra
note 198.
70. Supported by Blackstone and manifested at the time of the American Revolution by
Lord Mansfield. See infra pp. 52-56.
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goals of the legislature.71 The belief that individual liberty presumptively
defeated state utilitarian aims awaited the American Revolution, although
its beginnings are found in the Church penitentials of the thirteenth century
and as far back as the Old Testament.72
The requirement of mens rea and actus rea as a definitional element of
crime and guilt emanated from the Church’s answer to the question of
when institutional punishment was justified, in other words when it was
just. The answer, articulated in the pentitentials of the Middle Ages and its
requirement of reliable proof of the accused’s guilty mind manifested in a
guilty act, eventually reached beyond the Church to shape restrictions on
the state’s power to punish through the requirement proving mens rea and
actus rea prior to criminal conviction. For over seven centuries, mens rea
and actus rea served diligently as a protector of individual liberty and
protection from unjust punishment.73
Then, beginning in the thirteenth century and continuing through the
seventeenth century, the right to trial by a jury of peers (as contrasted with a
jury controlled by the Crown or by ordeal), the right against selfincrimination, the right to be informed of the charges against one and the
prohibition of using excessive fines or punishment to extract confessions,
joined mens rea in serving to limit unjust state action and elevated
individual liberty.
During these moral and procedural protections, however, the state
continued to utilize punishment as a means of proof, subjecting the accused
to the rack, or trial by ordeal, to obtain confessions or determine guilt—
justifying its actions through various doctrines of state supremacy.
This conduct strongly conflicted with the Church’s recognized purpose
of punishment—the restoration of right relationship (righteousness), which
logically rejects consequentialist or state utilitarian aims. The conflicts
between Parliament and the Crown often reflected the conflict between the
71. See, e.g., Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 959-61 (Kennedy, J., concurring)(Although
recognizing proportionality review is necessitated by the Eighth Amendment,
consequentialist peneological goals can justify a disproportionate sentence than justified by
retributive theories.). Foreign courts have followed J. Kennedy’s analysis thereby allowing
disproportionate sentencing that violates human dignity if such sentencing is justified by
consequentialist peneological aims. See e.g., S v. Dodo 2001 (3) SA 382 (CC) at para. 29-38 (S.
Afr.) (greatly limiting proportionality review to only gross proportionality). The South
African High Court held that legislative deference necessitated its consideration of
consequentialist penelogical interests in determining whether a sentence was grossly
disproportionate thereby eviscerating proportionality limits and diminishing human dignity.
See also Dawood v. Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (3) SA 936 (CC) (S. Afr.).
72. See infra pp. 31-32; See also supra note 67.
73. See infra Part III.
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established doctrines of state supremacy and existing state power with these
emerging concepts of individual dignity.
The world still awaited Jeremy Bentham’s Greatest Happiness Principle
and the 1789 publication of his Introduction to the Principles of Morals and
Legislation which, in the nineteenth century, began to erode the victory of
individualism.74
It is here important to explain that the canonist aim of restoring right
relationship is substantively different from the nineteenth century
utilitarian concept of state “rehabilitation.” Punishment for the purpose of
restoring right relationship derives from retributive and punitive goals and
its faith that just or proportional punishment serves the best interests of the
penitent or convicted. This recognizes the intrinsic value, or the humanity,
of the accused. In contrast, modern aims of rehabilitation, focus on the
otherness of the convicted, justifying perpetual state manipulation to
conform personality to state expectations. However, if this is not possible,
then supporting unlimited punishment for purposes of deterrence or
incapacitation or general happiness.75
As the American Revolution approached, England, the Crown, and now
Parliament, used punishment for its utility—to extract unreliable evidence
against its enemies (the use of torture) and then to punish those who were
not morally guilty (in sentencing), or threatening the same to extract
further evidence to use against the Crown’s enemies (excessive
amercements or threats of execution).
To the Founders, “cruel” punishments, therefore, involved any
punishment, pre- or post-conviction, which forwarded unjust interests of
the state by ignoring the value, personality, or autonomy of the individual.
Using man as a means, rather than recognizing man as the end,76 was
recognized as inherently unjust.
Punishment and the definition of crime, therefore, were inextricably
linked and the developments of substantive and procedural protections of
morally innocent persons from unjust state punishment was the aim of
those battling the oppressive monarchies in fifteenth and sixteenth-century
74. Utilitarianism is not necessarily a threat to equality as Bentham reasoned the
happiness of each person is to be valued equally. It is a direct assault to individualism,
however, as reflected in its brutal math – the happiness of two is always greater than the
happiness of one.
75. See infra pp. 23-52; Also, for an excellent criticism of “rehabilitation” as a state
penological goal, see C.S. LEWIS, THE HUMANITARIAN THEORY OF PUNISHMENT (criticizing
“rehabilitation” as a state penological goal).
76. See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 66-67, 429
(Allen W. Wood ed. trans., 2002).
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England and the American revolutionaries battling the oppressive
sixteenth-century Parliament.77
Macroscopically, the entirety of the conflict can be viewed as a struggle to
limit the power of the state to punish unjustly, to come to terms with the
circumstances when punishment is just, and to establish laws and
procedures to ensure state punishment is only imposed in just
circumstances. The path to this objective meandered as the personal
ambitions of powerful stake-holders often placed personal interests above
justice, yet the aim, the purpose for the inquiry, and the struggle was justice.
On July 4, 1776, individualism and a radical equality in law reached its
zenith in institutional expression.
At that time, the requirement of proving a guilty mind and a guilty act
prior to punishment for a crime was, in theory, unquestioned.78 Punishment
of the morally innocent wasn’t contemplated and was considered
disproportional.79 In the language of today’s Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence, punishing the innocent was grossly disproportional and
contrary to the intent of the Founders.80 The American Revolution did not
settle the age-old conflict between the individual and the state, and, today,
we have moved far away from this understanding.
As early as the turn of the eighteenth century, corresponding with the rise of
Bentham, Blackstone, and materialism, Thomas Jefferson observed the bud of
absolutism in America’s law schools, seeds that blossomed into the modern
regulatory state and the acceptance of strict liability public welfare crimes.81
All of this reveals that it is prudent to address the development and
dangers of strict liability crimes in a due process context while considering
the Eighth Amendment and not isolate punishment as solely a postconviction concern. Today, in America, the morally innocent are punished,
just as they were by England’s Stuart Kings who used the Royal prerogative
to justify torture as a means of proof. Today, Americans are voicing
increasing concern about the state punishing the morally blameless just as
America’s Founders criticized Parliamentary enactments denying
colonialists the right to trial by a jury of their peers—a parliamentary effort
viewed as a not-so-transparent attempt to ensure the conviction and
punishment of its enemies who, in the view of the colonists, were exercising

77. Id.
78. Infra at pp. 50-51.
79. This argument is fully developed in Part II.
80. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 995 (1991); see also Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S.
48, 59-60 (2010).
81. Infra at pp. 50-54.
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inherent rights and were morally innocent. The concern is, and always was,
justice and as such, is a moral aspiration.
B. An Explanation of This Article’s Organizational Structure.
Section III of this paper reviews the birth of s as a legal concept in the
West by visiting these English struggles of the fifteenth and sixteenthcenturies which gave expression to many of our principles of liberty. It also
includes a brief introductory section reviewing recent mens rea
jurisprudence. Section IV reviews Thomas Jefferson’s concerns about
American legal education, and its budding support for a state supremacy
and the threat posed to individual liberty. Section V chronicles the rise of
strict liability crimes and its evolution from legal positivism and Christian
fervor from the Second Great Awakening. Specifically, positivism’s original
rejection of metaphysical contemplations in defining law opened the door
to state supremacy through the application of consequentialist moral
theories. In Section VI, I join others in suggesting reform to reinvigorate
mens rea by treating knowledge of the law as a rebuttable presumption.
Section VII is the Conclusion.
This history reveals that a strong argument may be made that
imprisoning the innocent violates the original intent of the Eighth
Amendment prohibition of “cruel and unusual punishment.” Imprisoning
the morally innocent is contrary to the Founder’s intent, and an affront to
human dignity and thereby “grossly disproportional” punishment. At its
core, punishing the morally innocent offends human dignity, as defined by
Kant,82 and improperly diminishes the stamp of God’s image, as defined by
theologians. The full development of this argument, however, awaits
another publication—although the argument is foreshadowed here.

82. Kant’s “categorical imperative” prohibits using humans for utility, as a means, rather
than recognizing the individual as the end. See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 66-67, 429 (Allen W. Wood ed. trans., 2002); see generally H.J.
PATON, THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE: A STUDY IN KANT’S MORAL PHILOSOPHY (1948). “Now
I say that the human being, and in general every rational being, exists as end in itself, not
merely as means to the discretionary use of this or that will . . . . The practical imperative will
thus be the following: Act so that you use humanity, as much in your own person as in the
person of every other, always at the same time as an end and never merely as a means.”
IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK IN METAPHYSICS AND MORALS 45, 46-47 (Allen W. Wood,
ed. trans., 2002). The concept is not knew and is commonly referred to as the “golden rule”
as articulated by Jesus Christ. Matthew 7:12. Kant, however, writes that he reasoned to this
understanding rather than receiving it by revelation.
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III. MENS REA RADIATES FROM CHURCH DOCTRINE TO LEGAL DOCTRINE.
A. Brief Review of Current Mens Rea Jurisprudence: Judicial Endorsement
of Strict Liability Crimes Conflicts with our Nation’s Aspirational
Principles and, Therefore, is Unstable and Arbitrary.
“The federal ‘public welfare offense’83 doctrine [allowing strict criminal
liability] has been revealingly unstable from the moment of its inception,”84
and the instability is reflected in current Supreme Court jurisprudence.
The Court has held—or declared in dictum—that the following
persons are “presumptively” innocent, and must be proven to be
aware of both the facts as well as the law governing their conduct
[in order to be deemed guilty]: (1) restauranteurs who accept
food stamps;85 (2) taxpayers generally;86 (3) persons who seek
either to avoid an IRS audit, or to pay more alimony to their
spouse[s];87 (4) persons who distribute anything that turns out to
be illegal;88 (5) persons who handle guns, at least insofar as the
need to register them is concerned;89 and (6) persons whose cars
have violated emission standards.90
Conversely, the following persons, the Court has suggested, may be
subject to strict liability despite mistakes in fact or law: “(1) persons who
possess hand grenades,91 (2) [those] who handle highly toxic acids,92 (3)
83. Public welfare offenses constitute “a distinct group of offenses punishable without regard
to any mental element.” Francis Bowes Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 56
(1933) [hereinafter Public Welfare Offenses]. The Public Welfare Offense Doctrine originally
generally allowed for strict criminal liability in cases involving police regulatory offenses with
relatively small fines fitting into categories of public nuisances which are less odious than typical
criminal convictions. Id. at 62-67. Today, however, Congress has moved far beyond the original
justification for public welfare offenses and in numerous instances, in fact in an immeasurable
number of crimes, innocent persons can be sentenced to prison.
84. John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Not Guilty by Reason of Blamelessness: Culpability in
Federal Criminal Interpretation, 85 VA. L. REV. 1021, 1102 (1999).
85. See Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985).
86. See Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991) (dictum).
87. See Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994) (dictum).
88. See United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994). Singer and Husak
state, “[T}his seems an obvious overstatement of the case, but it seems fair.” Singer & Husak,
supra note 46, at 938.
89. See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994) (dictum).
90. Singer & Husak, supra note 46, at 938; Staples, 511 U.S. at 614 (dictum).
91. See United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971).
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[persons] who are in the business of dealing with regulated food stamps[,93
and (4) those] who distribute food for public consumption. . . .94 In
addition, every person . . . is presumed to know—the intricacies of
constitutional adjudication.”95
This discordant approach reflects tension between the intuitive
retributive aims of justice and restoration of “right relationship”96 and the
consequentialist penological aims of incapacitation, rehabilitation, and
specific and general deterrence.
This tension is not new, as evidenced in The Epic of Gilgamesh.
Individuals and states are constantly tempted to view others as a means to
an end, in other words—for their utility.
At the beginning of the twentieth-century, utilitarian goals and legal
positivism politically merged with fervor from the Second Great Awakening
to summon the state to the purpose of establishing a holy and safe nation
free from vice and threat. Christians engaged the effort by legislative
initiative and social reform while legal positivists placed their moral faith in
science-based government reform.97 Both efforts inordinately placed faith in
government initiative, thus diminishing individual liberty and value.98

92. See United States v. Int’l Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558 (1971).
93. Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 436 (1985).
94. See United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
95. Singer & Husak, supra note 47, at 939; see also Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192,
205-06 (1991).
96. The restoration of “right relationship,” or righteousness, is a primary aim of
punishment. The conditions for the restoration of right relationship between the offender
and victim, victim and society, offender and society and sinner and God are established
through proportional punishment. Conversely, consequentialist penological purposes
sacrifice the individual and such relationships to the aims of the state.
97. I use the term “moral faith” to distinguish faith in the scientific method to assist us
in determining what is, as contrasted with a faith that science, or materialism, should inform
us as to what “ought” to be. Science informs us of what “is” but when used to dictate what
“ought” to be becomes tyrannical, confining the human soul and spirit to material
measurements and slaying human aspiration. In short, science as what “ought” to be is fate.
Although the “ought-is” argument was first articulated by David Hume as a criticism of the
teleological argument for God’s existence, it is equally critical of science dictating, rather
than merely informing, morality. Hume argues the “ought-is” dilemma prevents proof of
God and I am simply saying it also prevents science from proclaiming itself as God. See e.g.,
DAVID HUME, TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE § 3.1.1 (1739); see also Charles Pigden, Hume on
Is and Ought, PHIL. NOW, https://philosophynow.org/issues/83/Hume_on_Is_and_Ought
(last visited February 11, 2018); Michael Shermer, The Is-Ought Fallacy of Science and
Morality, EDGE, https://www.edge.org/response-detail/23683 (last visited February 11, 2018).
98. See infra pp. 59-71.
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Conversely, at the time of America’s founding, the Judeo-Christian legal
concepts of equality before the law and the intrinsic value of the individual
as reflected in the moral agency, or image of God, in each individual
(individualism) teamed with the age of reason99 to reach full expression, but
not full implementation, and elevated the individual above the state in our
founding documents. This manifested in the establishment of numerous
contemporaneous constraints on state power and the aspirational language
of these documents laid the foundation for virtually all subsequent efforts to
expand equality.100
With the exception of Genesis chapters 1-3101 and John 3:16, there are
few expressions of the intrinsic value of each individual than the
Declaration of Independence.
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
99. Contrary to a secularly-biased interpretation of history, religious faith in a
purposeful creator gave rise to the age of reason and scientific advancement. This is uniquely
true pertaining to the religious beliefs of ancient Greek philosophers, Judaism and
Christianity. These beliefs, that God was rational and purposeful, prompted extensive efforts
to understand or know God through reason. Conversely, cultures that considered the
cosmos a mystery and the gods entirely arbitrary, believed the exercise of reason to
understand God’s purposes was futile. Plato argued that the order of the universe
demonstrated the existence of an intelligent god. “First, there is the evidence of the earth, the
sun, the stars, and all the universe, and the beautiful ordering of the seasons, marked out by
years and months . . . .” PLATO, THE LAWS, Bk. 10, § 886a 230 (2000).The existence of an
“intelligent first cause” was also articulated by Aquinas. See J.C. DOIG, AQUINAS ON
METAPHYSICS 291 (1972).
“Such order cannot be explained without an intelligent ordering cause. All
science is a search for order. Hence it presupposes that order is there. If it were
not, the world would be unintelligible. Hence all science, whether it is aware of
the fact or not, presupposes a first ordering principle capable of accounting for
the existence of the order it is seeking. This teleological argument is suggested
with many variations throughout [Plato’s] dialogues.”
John Wild, Plato and Christianity: A Philosophical Comparison, 17 J. OF BIBLE & RELIGION 3, 9
(1949). Judaic beliefs of a purposeful intelligent God are reflected in Genesis which is also a
part of the Christian Bible. John chapter one in the New Testament also bears witness to an
intelligent creator.
100. The words of the Declaration of Independence revealed America’s hypocrisy in the
treatment of slaves and women thereby providing persuasive force to the abolitionist and
woman’s suffrage movements. Recently, the same arguments for individual human dignity
have been successfully utilized by those seeking recognition of homosexual rights and the
rights of gender-variant persons. Whether endorsed or not, all such movements commonly
challenge the jurisdiction of the state to punish or conform conduct.
101. Genesis and the Gospels speak to God’s conquering love of humankind and His plan
of salvation.
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unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the
pursuit of Happiness. — That to secure these rights,
Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just
powers from the consent of the governed, — That whenever any
Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the
Right of the People to alter or to abolish it . . . .102
This statement, naturally and poetically expressed, came at great costs,
through centuries of struggle persisting through the doctrine of the Divine
Right of Kings103 and the later-proclaimed Doctrine of Parliamentary
Supremacy,104 to this nation’s founding.

102. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). I recognize the hesitancy of
legal scholars to cite to the Bible, however, such failure is to discard a significant source of
American political and legal thought. Whether you view the Bible as the inspired word of
God, as I do, or you view it as merely literature, you cannot deny its significant historical and
ongoing impact nor fully reject its powerful expressions of the important legal concepts of
equality, freedom and the intrinsic value of each person. To jettison these teachings because
they have been at times misused and are expressed in a religious document, is merely
intolerance in the claimed aim of tolerance.
103. The Divine Right of Kings was developed by James VI of Scotland (1567-1625) and
was developed fully by King James I of England (1603-1625).
The state of MONARCHIE is the supremest thing upon earth: for Kings are not
only Gods Lieutenants vpon earth, and sit upon Gods throne, but euen by God
himselfe are called Gods. . . . Kings are justly called Gods, for that they exercise
a manner or resemblance of diuine power vpon earth . . . [t]hat as to dispute
what God may doe, is Blasphemie . . . So is it sedition in Subiects to dispute
what a King may do in the height of his power . . . .
James I, A Speach to the Lords and Commons of the Parliament at White-Hall, (March, 21 1610),
https://faculty.history.wisc.edu/sommerville/351/Jamesdrk.htm (last visited December 13, 2017).
James’s theories echoed French theorist Jean Bodin (1530-1596) who published Six livres de la
republique in 1576. Bodin argued that sovereignty in any form of government necessarily rested in
one person. J. P. Summerville, Western Civilization II Guides, Absolutism and the Divine Right of
Kings, (Apr. 30, 2012), http://westerncivguides.umwblogs.org/2012/04/30/absolutism-and-thedivine-rights-of-kings/ (last visited February 11, 2018). Parliament’s conflicts with the scope,
authority and perceived excesses of Great Britain’s kings led to the English Civil War (1642-1651)
and eventually a recognition of Parliamentary Supremacy. See, Oliver Wright, The Independent
guide to the UK constitution: The supremacy of Parliament, THE INDEPENDENT (June 9, 2015),
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/the-independent-guide-to-the-uk-constitutionthe-supremacy-of-parliament-10308704.html (last visited February 11, 2018) (“The institution is
nothing short of an elected dictatorship.”).
104. See infra pp. 41-62.

2018]

IMPRISONING THE INNOCENT

417

B. English Conflict Gives Voice to the Principles of Equality and
Individualism.
1. By the Thirteenth Century Christian Concepts of Moral Guilt
Began to Overcome Pagan Notions of Consequentialism and Fate.
Foundational principles of liberty were intermittently articulated and
occasionally followed from 1215 in the fields of Runnymede105 to the House
of Commons and the British Declaration of Rights of 1689. Yet, in England,
these principles and the procedural protections of liberty were often
subsumed by state power.
The institutional struggle between the British Parliament and the
monarchy gave voice to developing theological, philosophical, and
jurisprudential theories recognizing the intrinsic value of the individual,
including the concept of mens rea so central to human dignity.
In the fifth century, after the dissolution of the Western Roman Empire,
Germanic tribal law generally replaced Roman law on the European
continent.106 The legal structure and organization of Germanic tribes was
“remarkably similar.”107 Households were organized into villages, villages
into hundreds of counties and these, in turn, into duchies or small
kingdoms.108 These structures served primarily for protection of persons
and property with little legal sophistication. Economic activity, a spur to the
creation of legal structure, was limited to cattle raising, subsidiary hunting,
and agricultural pursuits.109
The chief instrument of Germanic law was the “moot,” a public assembly
of household elders, and the primary aim of law was to prevent the blood
feud and conflict between households and villages by appeasing vengeance
and restoring honor.110

105. King John met with British barons in Runnymede in 1215 and was forced to sign the
Magna Carta. See Tanya Gupta, Magna Carta: Runnymede, the meadow where history was
made, BRITISH BROADCASTING CORP. (June 15, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-englandsurrey-32828251.
106. In 476 A.D. the Germanic leader Odacer defeated Romulus, the last Roman emperor
of the west. See The Fall of the Roman Empire, USHISTORY.ORG,
http://www.ushistory.org/civ/6f.asp (last visited February 11, 2018). The “fabric of Roman
law . . . virtually disappeared” in the Germanic kingdoms surviving only in northern Italy,
Spain and southern France. HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION 52-53 (1983).
107. BERMAN, supra note 105, at 52.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 52-53.
110. BERMAN, supra note 105, at 56. Interestingly, this governmental organization
reflected some democratic principles, yet lacked essential protections for individual
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Germanic pagan societies placed a “high value . . . upon honor as a
means of winning glory in a world dominated by warring gods and by a
hostile arbitrary fate (or wyrd). Honor, for Germanic man, meant ‘getting
even’; only by getting even could he conquer the forces of darkness
surrounding his life.”111
The Germanic focus on offended honor left little room to formally
consider the nature of the act by which honor suffered. The restoration of
honor required complete restoration for the harm caused and, therefore,
Germanic tribal law focused on the harm, or consequences, of the act rather
than the moral nature of the act. Praise was gained by taking what others
defended and lost when someone took what you defended.112
Moreover, sin, as understood by the tribes, and crime were synonymous
in tribal culture because honor determined how one stood in relationship
with the gods. The restoration of honor was essential to standing before,
with, or against the gods, who were often viewed as arbitrary and
mysterious.113
Wuotan, or Odin, the principal Germanic god is but one example. Pagan
gods were “limited by their particularity [and] [f]or Odin, any kind of
limitation is something to be overcome by any means necessary, and his
actions are carried out within the context of a relentless and ruthless quest
for more wisdom, more knowledge, and more power, usually of a magical
sort.”114
Odin, and like gods, were unpredictable and to a large extent
unknowable. And so too were their subjects. Those blessed by Odin would
likely become rulers, or outlaws.115 Fate was the determining force.116
The consequences, or harm, visited upon an individual or family,
however, was a tangible measure of the pleasure or displeasure of the gods.

freedoms. Democracy does not, intrinsically, protect liberty as, in its pure form, is merely the
rule of the majority. This was also true in Athens, which proved to be an oppressive society
for many of its residents. Neither does procedural due process ensure justice. Procedural due
process to an unjust law is merely organized injustice. See infra note 296 (describing the
sterilization of Carrie Buck).
111. BERMAN, supra note 105, at 55 (citation omitted).
112. Id.
113. Daniel McCoy, Odin, NORSE MYTHOLOGY FOR SMART PEOPLE, https://norsemythology.org/gods-and-creatures/the-aesir-gods-and-goddesses/odin/
(last
visited
February 11, 2018).
114. Id.
115. If power is the end, these results are logically deduced and one defeats the aim. If
truth and purpose are the aim, the results are irrelevant.
116. McCoy, supra note 112.
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Accordingly, this was seized upon by the Germanic tribes as a measurement
of restitution, and also of wrongfulness.
Consequently, the intent of the actor was not relevant to guilt or the
punishment. The morality of the act was measured by its consequences, not
the inherent nature of the act.
This overriding belief in fate and arbitrary gods “was reflected above all
in the use of the ordeal as a principal method of legal proof.”117
Proof of guilt was determined by the ordeal of fire or water, appealing to
the gods of each element.118 In the ordeal of fire, for example, the alleged
wrongdoer was burned in some fashion and if the wound healed in a set
timeframe, or he did not manifest a wound, he was declared innocent by the
gods.
Germanic tribal law was thus utilitarian in focus, keeping general peace
through the prevention of the blood feud without focusing on the intent or
mind of the actor.
The injustice and tragedy of fate and of strict liability approaches is
vividly portrayed in the epic Beowulf.119 In the epic, Beowulf comes to
Denmark to defeat a monster oppressing the kingdom. The story relates the
tragedy suffered by Beowulf’s grand-father King Hrethel in the loss of his
oldest son Herebald by the hands of his second son Haethcyn in a hunting
accident.120
when Haethcyn, his lord-friend, slew him with an arrow from his
horn-bow;
he missed his mark and shot his kinsman, one brother another,
with a bloody shaft.121
King Hrethel lost his oldest son and heir at the hands of another son.
Moreover, “the death of the slayer was required in expiation, thus requiring
the execution of the King’s second son.”122 After the execution, the grieving
117. BERMAN, supra note 105, at 57.
118. Id.
119. Beowulf depicts the pagan world of sixth-century Scandinavia but also contains
some Christian tradition, likely added as the story was orally related through generations.
The earliest dated manuscripts of Beowulf date from the end of the 10th century.
Manuscript: Beowulf, THE BRITISH LIBRARY, https://www.bl.uk/collection-items/beowulf#
(last visited February 11, 2018).
120. Linda Georgianna, King Hethrel’s Sorrow and the Limits of Heroic Action in Beowulf,
62 SPECULUM 829, 837 (1987).
121. DANIEL H. HAIGH, THE ANGLO-SAXON SAGAS: AN EXAMINATION OF THEIR VALUES AS
AIDS TO HISTORY 39 (London, John Russel Smith 1861) (quoting BEOWULF (Chronicles)).
122. Sayre, at 1026, note 9, supra note PDK; See infra 24-27.
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King Hrethel took his own life. All three, therefore, were the victims of fate
and not offered justice.
These consequentialist approaches to guilt and proper punishment
contrasted dramatically with Judeo-Christian concepts of guilt and
punishment. Jewish and Christian thought rejected paganism and fate,
seeking right relationship (righteousness) rather than honor, and expressing
hope in divine purpose, rather than residing in the despair of fate.123
This focus on right relationship required an understanding of the
individual’s heart, or mind, when determining the moral nature of conduct.
It became important to determine the intent, or purpose, of the actor’s
conduct in order to determine the merit of that conduct. This
determination was not only important in determining whether the conduct
was praiseworthy or condemnable, but also the nature of the proper
punishment if wrongful.
Judeo-Christian approaches to criminal guilt, therefore, “were more
concerned with the care of souls than with the appeasement of
vengeance.”124
The tension between consequentialist approaches to punishment and
recognizing the importance of the moral guilt or innocence of the
individual is reflected in the Bible in Deuteronomy 19:1-7. Therein God
commands the people of Israel, when possessing the promised land, to “set
aside for yourselves three cities centrally located . . . . so that anyone who
kills a man [without malice aforethought] may flee there . . . . Otherwise, the
avenger of blood might pursue him in a rage, overtake him . . . and kill him
even though he is not deserving.”125
The city of refuge is to be available to those who kill
“unintentionally.” For instance, a man may go into the forest
with his neighbor to cut wood, and as he swings his ax to fell a
tree, the head may fly off and hit his neighbor and kill him. That
man may flee to one of these cities and save his life.126

123. When encountering a man blind from birth, Jesus’s disciples ask him “Rabbi, who
sinned, this man or his parents, that he was born blind?” Jesus responded “[n]either this man
or his parents sinned, but his happened so that the works of God might be displayed in him.”
Jesus encouraged his disciples to place faith and hope in the purposes of God and to not
judge fellow man. John 9:1-7(NIV).
124. BERMAN, supra note 105, at 68.
125. Deuteronomy 19:1-6 (NIV).
126. Deuteronomy 19:5 (NIV).
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God commands this of Israel “so that innocent blood will not be shed in
your land . . . and so that you will not be guilty of bloodshed.”127
Here again, is the moral question of when the state has the right to
punish or coerce the conduct of the individual. This moral question, a
question sounding in justice, is central to the purposes of law and thereby in
the determination of what is law.128 This debate animates the English
conflicts between Parliament and Kings during the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries and is central to the American Revolution.129
Yet, ancient Israel retained some mysticism reflected in its laws. Women
accused of unfaithfulness were subjected to a trial by ordeal by which the
subsequent inability to have children would proclaim their guilt and good
health their innocence.130 Perceived or real inconsistencies, however, do not
defeat the power of truth131 and Christianity and its evolving concepts of
justice slowly marched across Europe through five centuries after the fall of
the western empire. At that time, the Church’s doctrinal approach to sin
and focus on restoration of the human heart began to impact the legal
127. Deuteronomy 19:10 (NIV) (emphasis added).
128. This approach rejects the original positivist claim that law can be defined absent
moral references. See infra pp. 59-72.
129. Only with the rise of legal positivism, the initiation of public welfare crimes and the
application of scientific reductionism to penological aims was the quest for state justification
abated by the assumption that the state had inherent authority to “treat” or “rehabilitate” or
incapacitate the offender. See infra pp. 62-76.
130. Numbers 5:11-31. See also COLE, R. D., NUMBERS Vol. 3B 117 (2000). Notably, a
woman was not subjected to trial by ordeal unless there was a belief in guilt and absence of
other proof available. This same concern, the absence of proof in the face of strongly
suspected guilt, gave rise to the use of torture as a means of proof in continental Europe
during the middle ages. See infra pp. 23-51.
131. The creation story in Genesis is often misunderstood as a story of judgment by
failing to recognize it as a story of God’s love. Blessing Adam with the stamp of his image,
placing before Adam all of God’s first fruits for Adam’s use, God only offered one restriction
– Adam could not redesign truth, he could not eat of the apple of the tree of knowledge and
good and evil. It is telling that Adam was able to touch the apple and eat of any other fruit in
the garden. He was simply prohibited from ingesting truth and spitting out his own version
of it. This prohibition was necessary, for Adam was eternal. Imagine the nature of things if
man was eternally able to redesign and redefine truth. Upon first sin, man did not curse
Adam or Eve but rather sought them out in relationship. Genesis 1-3. God did curse the
serpent, but while promising humankind’s salvation. Genesis 3:15 (NIV) (“I will put enmity
between you and the woman and between your offspring and hers; he will crush your head . .
. .”) God did limit man’s days in order to preserve truth, while immediately making possible
eternal life through His love. John 1:1-3, 17. In other words, God preserved truth while
extending grace through a suffering love. In such truth, grace and love – we can, and should,
have faith. See infra note 333. Humankind’s failings are real, but the truth, thanks to the
grace of God, is not defeated by those failings.
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understanding of crime. “[A]t least in the recorded law prior to the twelfth
century, a criminal intent was not recognized as an indispensable requisite
for criminality.”132
Penitentials, originating in monasteries and influenced by the theology
and philosophy of St. Anselm,133 and others gained increased influence.
These monasteries established their “own miniature legal order.”134 Each
penitential was offered as guide for priests in their handling of confessors,
so that punishment appropriate, or proportional to the sin,135 could be
offered to restore righteousness, or right relationship.136
The penitentials considered crime an offense against another and an
offense against God and possibly the Church, rather than an offense against
the state.137 The penalty, therefore, required restitution to the victim and
some form of proportional punishment, required by divine justice for the
restoration of right relationship between the offender and victim, and the
offender and God.138 This punishment vindicated the law and also

132. Francis Bowes Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974, 977 (1932) [hereinafter Mens
Rea].
133. St. Anselm (1033-1109) developed the satisfaction theory of Christ’s atonement
reasoning that God’s just nature compels that “blessedness ought not to be given to anyone
unless his sins are wholly remitted, and that this remission ought not to be done except by
the payment of the debt” thus necessitating the incarnation of Christ as to afford mercy prior
to payment is treat the guilty and not guilty equally thereby rendering “injustice . . . if it is
remitted by mercy alone, more free than justice, which seems very improper.” ST. ANSELM,
Whether It Were Proper for God to Put Away Sins by Compassion Alone, Without Any
Payment of Debt, in CUR DEUS HOMO 29-31 (2d ed. 1865); ST. ANSELM, How, As Long As Man
Does Not Restore What He Owes God, He Cannot Be Happy, Nor Is He Excused by Want of
Power, in CUR DEUS HOMO 56-58 (2d ed. 1865);. Anselm added “I do not deny that God is
merciful . . . . But we are speaking of that ultimate mercy by which he makes men blessed
after this life.” ST. ANSELM, How, As Long As Man Does Not Restore What He Owes God, He
Cannot Be Happy, Nor Is He Excused by Want of Power, in CUR DEUS HOMO 56-58 (2d ed.
1865); See generally Tuomala, supra note 7.
134. BERMAN, supra note 105, at 69.
135. Proportionality in punishment was also an important concept in the development of
the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
136. See, e.g., BERMAN, supra note 105, at 69-72, 181-83.
137. Id. at 181. Scripture reveals a God of righteousness who desires righteousness in His
people. Righteousness encompasses normative concepts, justice, morally right action and
other considerations that lead to “right relationship.” See also supra note 80 (discussing
righteousness premised on right relationship).
138. BERMAN, supra note 105, at 182-83. Milne, B. A. (1996). Righteousness. In D. R. W.
Wood, I. H. Marshall, A. R. Millard, J. I. Packer, & D. J. Wiseman (Eds.), New Bible
dictionary (3rd ed., pp. 1020–1021). Leicester, England; Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity
Press..
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vindicated the offender as a rational person, capable of choosing good and
evil, and intrinsically worthy of restoration.
This necessarily “placed a strong emphasis on the moral nature of the act
and [consequently on] the state of [the offender’s] mind at the time of the
act.”139 The penitentials’s focus on the actor’s mind assists in determining
whether punishment is justified to begin with and is only then relevant to
determine the nature and degree of punishment. This contrasts with
consequentialist peneological aims which focus on the actor’s intent, or
mindset, not to determine guilt, but only to determine the type and length
of punishment (or treatment) to impose. Guilt and the state’s right to
punish is, although not admittedly, presumed in consequentialism.140
Since, at the time of the penitentials, there was not a distinction between
crime and tort and crime and sin, and “all have sinned and fall short of the
glory of God,”141 the community and the judge identified with the offender.
“[T]he association of crime with sin, and of punishment with atonement,
gave the criminal or sinner a certain dignity vis-à-vis his accusers, his
judges, and his other fellow Christians. They too were sinners . . . . This
alleviated [an] element of moral superiority” held by those administering
justice142 and “de-emphasize[d] self-righteous indignation as a component
of criminal law.”143
Punishment emphasized likeness, rather than otherness, such that
witnesses to public punishments in seventeenth century New England all
identified as potential and actual sinners.144 Thus, punishing the offender
identified, not separated, the offender from the community of rational
beings by “assuming the universalizability of his act, and . . . by applying the
universalized norm to him as a rational person.”145 Otherwise, one is apt to
forget “[a] felon is a man and by men should be treated as a man”146 and
139. Id. at 183; see also Tuomala, supra note 7.
140. See infra at 57-67 ; see generally Dubber, supra note 36. Moreover, Jeremy Bentham
attacked the notion of inherent or natural rights. See infra note 297, 341 and citations
therein.
141. Romans 3:23 (NIV).
142. BERMAN, supra note 105, at 183.
143. Id. at 184.
144. For similar views in England see LINCOLN FALLER, TURNED TO ACCOUNT: THE FORMS
AND FUNCTIONS OF CRIMINAL BIOGRAPHY IN LATE SEVENTEENTH-AND EARLY EIGHTEENTH
CENTURY ENGLAND 54 (1987). See also Gerald Leonard, Towards a Legal History of American
Criminal Theory: Culture and Doctrine from Blackstone to the Model Penal Code, 6 BUFF.
CRIM. L. REV. 691, 737 (2003).
145. Dubber, supra note 36, at 118.
146. JOHN HOWARD, THE STATE OF PRISONS IN ENGLAND AND WALES 12 (1777).
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that punishment should be inflicted “not out of hate but rather out of
charity.”147
Moral blameworthiness, or intent, therefore, determined whether a sin
had been committed and if so, the degree of punishment, or penance,
necessary for restoration of right relationship with the offender viewed as
one worthy of restoration.
By the eleventh-century the “canonists long insiste[nce] that the mental
element was the real criterion of guilt . . . was making itself strongly felt,”148
resulting in moral blameworthiness becoming the “foundation of legal
guilt.”149
Henry de Bracton (1210-1268), in his De Legibus et Consuetudinibus
Angliae,150 described by F.W. Maitland as “the crown and flower of English
jurisprudence,”151 lifted his law on homicide directly from the canonist
Bernard of Pavia,152 distinguishing between homicide “by [the
administration of] justice, necessity, misadventure and desire.”153
Bracton also echoed the theology behind the concept of mens rea, or
moral guilt.
[W]e must consider with what mind [ammo] or with what intent
[voluntate] a thing is done, in fact or in judgment, in order that it
may be determined accordingly what action should follow and
what punishment. For take away the will and every act will be
indifferent, because your state of mind gives meaning to your act,

147. Canon 8, Fourth Lateran Council (1215), PAPAL ENCYCLICALS ONLINE,
http://www.papalencyclicals.net/councils/ecum12-2.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2018). The
Fourth Lateran Council of 1215, in Canon 18 also prohibited priest participation in trial by
ordeals, eventually bringing an end to that practice. Moreover, Canon 8 required
ecclesiastical courts to afford the accused the right to confront his witnesses, be informed of
the charges against him and to call and question witnesses. Id. All such concerns reflect the
concern for the honest determination of subjective guilt and the restoration of the guilty into
right relationship with the Church, society and God.
148. Sayre, supra note 131, at 980.
149. Id.
150. “On the laws and customs of England.”
151. Bracton Online, HARV. L. SCH. LIB., http://bracton.law.harvard.edu/ (last visited
February 11, 2018).
152. 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 477, note 4 (2d ed. 1923); Twiss
Travers, Introduction to ) [hereinafter Maitland]; 2 BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS at lviii (Twiss
transl. 1879).
153. BRACTON, supra note 151, at 120b.
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and a crime is not committed unless the intent to injure [nocendi
voluntas] intervene, nor is a theft committed except to steal.154
At the time of Bracton’s writings, Church influence was growing yet
England still retained strict liability crimes originating from tribal laws.
Westgothic law provided that “whoever shall have killed a man whether he
committed the homicide intending or not intending to [volens aut nolens]
let him be handed over into the potestas [power] of the parents or next of
kin of the deceased.”155 And homicide retained its strict liability nature in
the twelfth century.
Christian distinctions of the actor’s mental state, however, gave
justification for different punishments for different conduct that,
nevertheless, caused the same consequences. Bracton noted “[i]t appertains
to the lord the king and his crown to take cognizance of . . . the crime of
homicide, whether by misadventure or by design, although these do not
entail the same punishment, because in the one case rigor obtains and in the
other mercy.”156
Moreover, the Church’s focus on moral guilt served to protect human
agency in another manner. The Church, at least theologically, acted in
humility by recognizing its limits. Although the Church recognized sin as a
matter of the mind, “for the very essence of moral guilt is a mental
element,”157 it distinguished between venial (pardonable sins requiring no
punishment) and criminal sins (violations of ecclesiastical law which
required punishment) by prohibiting conviction for criminal sins unless a
guilty mind was accompanied by a guilty act, or actus rea. Moreover, the
guilty act must be, in some form, substantial or vexatious.
Peter Abelard (1079-1142) argued there were three conditions for
criminal sins: (1) mortal sins sufficiently grave to warrant punishment; (2)
that were manifested by an external act as evidence of wrongful intent; and
(3) that the sin is vexatious to the Church and not merely a private harm.158

154. Id. at 101b.
155. John H. Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts, 7 HARV. L. REV. 315, 321 (1894)
(quoting 1 WALTER, CORPUS JURIS GERMANICA 668).
156. BRACTON, supra note 151, at 104b. At the time of his writing, England still retained
strict liability crimes stemming from tribal law. Yet, the Church’s influence was felt in the
expression of punishment for the act. Unintentional acts generally received the King’s mercy
rather than punishment. See Sayre, supra note 131, at 977-82.
157. Sayre, supra note 131, at 988. See also Matthew 5:27-28 (NIV) (“You have heard that
it was said, ‘Do not commit adultery.’ But I tell you that anyone who looks at a woman
lustfully has already committed adultery in his heart.”).
158. BERMAN, supra note 105, at 185.
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The requirement of an external act was necessary because “only God can
see the human heart”159 and, also, in order to value that which God values—
who has declared “nothing more valuable than a rational creature capable of
enjoying him”—man should refrain from judging reason alone.160
Guilt and punishment were determined by a more humble means than
honor and pride, and, thus, mens rea and actus rea became a bulwark of
personal freedom and protection against state and church punishment.161
“[T]he teaching of the penitential books that punishment should be
dependent upon the moral guilt . . . [had such a powerful impact that]
[h]enceforth, the criminal law of England, developing in the general
direction of moral blameworthiness, begins to insist upon a mens rea as an
essential of criminality.”162
Christian teaching supplanted fate with hope, thus gifting purpose to the
Christian teaching that each individual must concern himself with his
personal salvation implied purpose and free will.163
The penitentials, therefore, postulated that each individual is “a free
moral agent, confronted with a choice between doing right and doing
wrong and choosing freely to do wrong.”164
“If, as Shakespeare wrote, the fault is ‘in ourselves,’ it is because we
believe we have the opportunity to choose well. Unlike the Greeks and
Romans, whose gods were remarkably lacking in virtue and did not concern
themselves with human misbehavior (other than failures to propitiate them

159. Id. This is not to say that a corrupt Church did not, at times, punish unnecessarily or
unjustly, nor to argue that the Church was not, at times, motivated by power, rather than the
preservation of souls. Such is the human condition. Yet, these failings do not defeat the logic
or reason behind creating a distinction between sin and crimes and separating jurisdiction
between the state and church.
160. ST. ANSELM, How Nothing Less Was to Be Endured, in the Order of Things, Than
That the Creature Should Take Away the Honor Due the Creator and Not Restore What He
Takes Away, in CUR DEUS HOMO 26-28 (2d ed. 1865); ST. ANSELM, How the Honor of God
Exists in the Punishment of the Wicked, in CUR DEUS HOMO 28-29 (2d ed. 1865). See also
BERMAN, supra note 105, at 183.
161. I argue that legal positivism and the legal reform movement emanating from the
Second Great Awakening bot committed the same error, that of hubris or pride, in defining
the purpose of law. Both had the same motivation, the creation by the state of utopia, and the
same faith in the institutions of man. See infra pp. 52-61.
162. Sayre, supra note 131, at 988.
163. Most modern, mid-eighteenth and early-nineteenth century, penoleological theories
are premised on a materialistic non-metaphysical belief system which denies the free will or
personality of the offender. See generally Dubber, supra note 36.
164. See GARLAND, supra note 14, at 550-51 (quoting ROSCOE POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE
IN AMERICA 33 (1930)).
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in an appropriate manner), the Christian God is a judge who rewards
‘virtue’ and punishes ‘sin’”165 to satisfy justice and lay the foundation for
restoration.
The concept of free will was reconciled with an all knowing omnipotent
God by Augustine, among others. “God knows all things before they come
to pass, and that we do by our free will whatsoever we know and feel to be
done by us only because we will it. But that all things come to pass by fate,
we do not say; nay we affirm that nothing comes to pass by fate . . . .”166
Christ’s command to “go and sin no more”167 is irrational in a world
controlled by fate.
Jesus’s radical teaching of radical moral equality, not premised on
outcomes but rather the intrinsic value of the individual as gifted by God,
was having an impact. Jesus constantly violated the letter of the law and
cultural convention in order to highlight the purpose of law—the
restoration of right relationship and the expression of the love of God. He
healed on the Sabbath, touched the untouchable, and lectured legal experts
and law-keepers.168 Jesus eviscerated status and man-made boundaries by
associating with sinners, outcasts, publicans, beggars, and the unclean. As
Paul exhorted, “There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor
free, there is neither male nor female: for ye are all one in Christ Jesus.”169

165. RODNEY STAR, THE VICTORY OF REASON – HOW CHRISTIANITY LED TO FREEDOM,
CAPITALISM, AND WESTERN SUCCESS 32 (Random House, 2005)[hereinafter VICTORY].
166. AUGUSTINE, Concerning the Foreknowledge of God and the Free Will of Man, in
Opposition to the Definition of Cicero, in CITY OF GOD (BOOK V) (Marcus Dods trans., T. & T.
Clark 1872-76) .
167. John 8:11 (NIV). See also Luke 10:37 (NIV) (Christ instructs the lawyer to love his
neighbor with the command “go and do likewise”).
168. See, e.g., John 5:1-45 (Jesus heals a paralytic on the Sabbath and lectures the
Pharisees for placing their faith in the law rather than the love of God stating “I will [not]
accuse you before the father. Your accuser is Moses on whom your hopes are set.”); John 9:141 (Jesus heals a blind man on the Sabbath and calls the Pharisees spiritually blind and
guilty); Mark 5:21-36 (Jesus, through touch, heals a bleeding woman who was considered
unclean under Jewish law and therefore untouchable). Jesus lectured a Jewish lawyer on the
meaning of loving one’s neighbor, portraying a Samaritan, a race of people abhorrent to
observant Jews, as fulfilling God’s commandment to love one’s neighbor in the face of the
Jewish elite’s sidestepping the law. Luke 10:25:37 (the parable of the Good Samaritan).
Samaritan’s were descendants of Israel who inter-married with Assyrians and were despised
by the Jews.
169. Galatians 3:28 (NIV).
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And Jesus’s grace and love placed the disciple Peter on the same ground
as the thief crucified with Christ, restoring both into the Kingdom of God
through faith.170
This moral equality expressed itself in Christian concepts of justice.
Third century theologian L. Caecilius Firmianus Lactantius reasoned “the
second constituent of Justice is equity,” or equality.171
[I]t is plain that I am not speaking of the equity of judging well,
though this also is praiseworthy in a just man, but of making
himself equal to others, which Cicero calls equalbility. For God,
who produces and gives breath to men, will that all should be
equal, that is, equally matched. He has imposed on all the same
condition of living; He has produced all to wisdom; He has
promised immortality to all; no one is cut off from His heavenly
benefits. For as He distributes to all alike His one light, sends
forth His fountains to all, supplies food, and gives most pleasant
rest of sleep; so He bestows on all equity and virtue. In His sight
no one is slave, no one a master; for [all have the same Father].172
Individualism and equality bolstered the belief that an innocent persons
should not suffer from state punishment and strengthened the position of
those who sought protection of the morally innocent in law.
In 1215, the Magna Carta, or the Great Charter, gave voice to these
concepts of individualism and equality. At the time England was suffering
under the disastrous reign of King John (1199-1216).173 John, within five

170. See Luke 23:40-43 (Jesus promising the thief will join Him in paradise); John 21:1521 (Jesus reinstates Peter after Peter denies Christ).
171. Lactantius, Divine Institutes, Book V, Chapter 15, CHURCH FATHERS,
http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/07015.htm (last visited February 11, 2018). Lactantius
identifies piety, “the conception of God,” as the first principle of justice, inseparable from
equity. Id. “Piety is the worship of God, and it is the ‘originating impulse’ of justice.” DAVID
P. GUSHEE & ISAAC B. SHARP, EVANGELICAL ETHICS 111 (Westminster John Knox Press, 2015).
172. Lactantius, supra note 170. Lactantius added,
Although our attitude of humility makes us one another’s equals, free and slave,
rich and poor, there are, in fact, distinctions which God makes, distinctions in
virtue, that is: the juster the higher. For if justice means behaving as the equal of
inferiors, then although it is equality that one excels in, yet by conducting
oneself not merely as the equal of one’s inferior, but as their subordinate, one
will attain a far higher rank of dignity in God’s sight . . . .
Id.
173. Marc Morris, King John: the most evil monarch in Britain’s history, THE TELEGRAPH
(June 13, 2015), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/11671441/King-John-the-most-evilmonarch-in-Britains-history.html.
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years of assuming the throne, had lost most of England’s continental
territories.174 Determined to recoup his losses, John dramatically increased
taxes to raise funds for a campaign, thus offending the nobles.175 John’s
cruelty also set him at odds with his subjects. John imprisoned and tortured
Jews until they agreed to pay confiscatory taxes and ordered the torture and
execution of those who opposed him.176
When John’s campaign to reclaim his lands failed, the English barons
grew determined to bring reform to England. On June 15, 1215, the Barons
forced John to sign the Magna Carta.177 The document contains 4,000 words
and 63 clauses. Over time, the Magna Carta came to serve as the foundation
of England’s uncodified constitution.178
Among the charter’s clauses is a prohibition against disproportionate
punishment and fines, and the requirement of “the oaths of honest men of
the neighborhood”179 prior to any criminal conviction.180 Moreover, no
punishment was to be imposed on subjects “except by the legal judgment of
his peers or by the law of the land.”181 The right to a trial by a jury of one’s

174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Magna Carta 1215, 17 John, ¶ 20 (1215), reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 15
(Richard L. Perry ed., 1991) [hereinafter SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES].
180. Id. ¶ 38, at 17.
181. Id. ¶ 39, at 17. Justice Story recognized the Magna Carta as the source of our
Constitutional right to a jury trial in an essay published in 1873:
It seems hardly necessary in this place to expatiate upon the antiquity, or
importance of the trial by jury in criminal cases. It was from very early times
insisted on by our ancestors in the parent country, as the great bulwark of their
civil and political liberties, and watched with an unceasing jealousy and
solicitude. The right constitutes the fundamental articles of Magna Carta . . . .
The judgment of his peers here alluded to, and commonly called in the quaint
language of former times a trail per pais, or trial by the country, is the trial by a
jury, who are called the peers of the party accused, being of the like condition
and equality in the state. When our more immediate ancestors removed to
America, they bought this great privilege with them, as their birth-right and
inheritance, as a part of that admirable common law, which had fenced round,
and interposed barriers on every side against the approaches of arbitrary power.
3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES; WITH A
PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE COLONIES AND STATES, BEFORE
THE ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION 652-53 (4th ed. 1873). See also Kenneth Pennington,
Reform in 1215: Magna Carta and the Fourth Lateran Council, 32 BULL. MEDIEVAL CANON L.
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peers was necessary to prevent the King from using the criminal process to
punish his enemies—in other words, to convict and punish the innocent.182
The same concerns found expression in Pope Innocent III’s efforts to
address Church corruption by calling the Fourth Lateran Council which
met in November of 1215.183 The council was widely attended, with 71
patriarchs and metropolitans, 412 bishops, 900 abbots and priors, envoys
from Emperors Fredrick II and Henry Latin of Constantinople, and envoys
from the Kings of France, England, Aragon, Hungary, Cyprus, and
Jerusalem.184
The Canons emanating from the Fourth Lateran Council reflect the
impact of theology on Europe’s emerging jurisprudence and its concern to
limit institutional power to punish the innocent. For instance, Canon 8
provides strict limits on ecclesiastical inquests or investigations: “How and
in what way a prelate ought to proceed185 to inquire into and punish the
offences of his subjects may be clearly ascertained from the authorities of
the new and old Testament, from which subsequent sanctions in canon law
derive.”186
The Council confirms an investigation should only be joined when
“prudent and honest persons” come forward with accusations and should
only be an effort to “diligently . . . seek out the truth.”187 Moreover, any
criminal accusation which entails loss of status [for the church
official] shall in no wise be allowed unless it is preceded by a
charge in lawful form. . . . The person about whom the inquiry is
97, 104-05 (2015) (quoting MAGNA CARTA, Chapter 39). Pennington argues this Chapter also
prohibited trial by ordeal which was routinely exercised by Royal prerogative. Id. at 105-10.
182. England did not have an independent judiciary at the time. See, e.g., History of the
Judiciary, CTS. & TRIBUNALS JUDICIARY, https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/about-thejudiciary/history-of-the-judiciary/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2018); Judicial Independence,
POLITICS.CO.UK, http://www.politics.co.uk/reference/judicial-independence (last visited Apr.
17, 2018).
183. Henri
Leclercq,
Fourth
Lateran
Council
(1215),
NEW ADVENT,
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/09018a.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2018).
184. Id.
185. Here, we have another example of the inherent metaphysical contemplations of law
with the use of the term ought, rather than is. See infra at 56.
186. Fourth Lateran Council: 1215, Canon 8, PAPAL ENCYCLICALS ONLINE,
http://www.papalencyclicals.net/councils/ecum12-2.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2018)
[hereinafter Lateran].
187. Id. This requirement of witnesses is reflected in Chapter 38 of the Magna Carta
which reads, “[f]rom this time forward no bailiff shall bring anyone to court on just his
authority alone, unless good witnesses provide evidence.” Pennington, supra note 176, at 103
(quoting MAGNA CARTA, Chapter 38).
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being made ought to be present . . . [, and] [t]he articles of the
inquiry should be shown to him so that he may be able to defend
himself.188 The names of witnesses as well as their depositions are
to be made known to him so that both what has been said and by
whom will be apparent; and legitimate exceptions and responses
are to be admitted, lest the suppression of names leads to the
bold bringing false charges and the exclusion of exceptions leads
to false depositions being made.189
Also, Canon 18 prohibits priests participating in or blessing trials by
ordeal.190 These procedural protections were confirmed in the Magna Carta
in Chapter 39.191
The Magna Carta also addresses concerns with punishing the innocent
by prohibiting excessive fines, or amercements. Such fines were often
applied by royal prerogative to coerce confessions from the innocent.192
Chapter 40 reads, “[a] nulli ne vendrons, a nullui n’escondirons, ne ne
porloignersons dreit ne justice . . . . To no one will we sell, to no one will we
deny or delay right or justice.”193

188. This is an express rejection of the civil law procedures on the European continent
that allowed a procurator to question the accused while keeping the accused ignorant of the
charge. This technique, at times, was also used in England by the Court of High Commission
and Privy Council and by ecclesiastical courts even after the Fourth Lateran Council.
189. Lateran, supra note 185, Canon 8. Here ,we have the beginnings of the Sixth
Amendment right of confrontation.
190. Id. at Canon 18.
191. Pennington, supra note 176, at 105-10 (arguing this Chapter also prohibited trial by
ordeal which was routinely exercised by Royal prerogative).
192. Amercements replaced the bot and were after the Norman Conquests and a
requirement of proportionality was soon imposed to limit Royal extravagance. John F.
Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality Under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, 97
VA. L. REV. 899, 928-29 (2011). This included the procedural protection that amercements
were to be levied, not by the King, but rather by “the oath of lawful men of the
neighborhood.” Id. at 929 (citing WILLIAM MCKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA: A COMMENTARY ON
THE GREAT CHARTER OF KING JOHN 285 (1914)). But during his reign, King John abandoned
proportionality in amercements in order to use the threat of prison to force payment. Id.
Three chapters of the Magna Carta address excessive penalties. Id.
193. Pennington, supra note 176, at 110 (quoting MAGNA CARTA, Chapter 40). See also
ENG. BILL OF RIGHTS, ¶¶ 10-12 (1689), reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 174,
at 246.
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2. Doctrines of State Supremacy begin to Challenge the Christian
Moral Concept of Guilt.
Parliament’s struggle with the monarchy was rejoined in 1297 as Royal
officials strayed from the principles of the Magna Carta. Because King
Edward I was locked in conflict in Scotland and in the continent of Europe,
he required new taxes and, thus, a summons of Parliament.194 English
nobles refused to support the King’s tax unless Edward confirmed the
Magna Carta.195 In 1297, he did so.196 The Confirmatio Cartarum confirmed
the liberties of the charter and stated “[t]hat if any judgment be given from
henceforth contrary to the points of the [Magna Carta] by the justices, or by
any other our minsters that hold plea before them against the points of the
charters, it shall be undone, and holden for nought.”197
The Confirmatio Cartarum represented the strongest assault on the
power of the monarchy to date by expressly declaring the King’s conduct
subject to the common law. These documents gained their power over time
as Parliament responded to the Crown’s new unusual methods of avoiding
its prohibitions.198
By the Seventeenth Century, British monarchs justified their royal
excesses by the Doctrine of the Divine Right of Kings, philosophically
developed by Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) in the Leviathan199 and
forwarded by King James I of England.200 Exercising this “divine right,”
194. Parliament served at the pleasure of the King but the consent of Parliament was
practically, if not legally, necessary in order to collect taxes. See, e.g., Magna Carta and
Parliament, MAGNA CARTA, http://www.magnacarta.senate.gov.au/index.php/parliament/
(last visited Apr. 17, 2018); SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 174, at 24-25.
195. SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 174, at 24-25.
196. Id.
197. CONFIRMATIO CARTARUM, ¶ 2 (1297), reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra
note 174, at 30. The document also required the “common assent of the realm” prior to the
imposition of new taxes. Id. at 31, ¶ 6. This clause is recognized as the origin of the right to
not be taxed without representation. SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 174.
198. Parliament often criticized the conduct of monarch’s by describing their actions as
“unusual,” or contrary to long usage or precedent. SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 174.
This language was also use to prohibit certain punishments in the Eighth Amendment.
“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (emphasis added).
199. Hobbes postulated that the state of nature is brutal and insecure with each
individual aiming at self-preservation. To suppress this natural expression of man, a strong
government with powers vested in a singular person was necessary. See generally THOMAS
HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (1651).
200. James was also King James IV of Scotland and served as the first monarch of both
kingdoms.
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King James levied impositions,201 exercised the power to remove judges not
to his liking, and increased the power of courts formed under the Royal
Prerogative, including the Court of Star Chamber and the Court of High
Commission.202 The Court of High Commission adopted torture as a
method of proof, consistent with civil law on the European Continent.203
Charles I succeeded James in 1625, and he continued James’s methods,
forcing his subjects to loan funds to the Crown to fund his war with Spain.
Those who refused the “loan” were imprisoned by the King’s judges. Some
sought review of their imprisonment by a writ of habeous corpus before the
Court of King’s Bench. This was an effort to remove themselves from
jurisdiction of the Star Chamber Court comprised of members of the King’s
Privy Council.204
Writs, however, had to be approved by the King. Prior to approval of the
writs, Charles met with the judges of the King’s Bench and obtained
assurances the court’s decision would favor the King.205 The King’s Bench
later rejected all of the writs in the “Five Knights Case” and returned the
subjects to prison.206 Outrage with the King’s manipulation of the courts
“focused public attention upon the right of personal liberty” and led to
Parliament passing the Petition of Right in 1628.207
In passing the petition, Sir Benjamin Rudyard proclaimed that it was
time for the Magna Carta “which hath been kept so long, and lien bed-rid, .
. . [to] walk abroad again with new vigour and lustre.”208 Sir Edward Coke, a
former member of the Star Chamber and former Chief Justice of the Court
of Common Pleas, also rose in defense of individually liberty and railed
against the imprisonment of the innocent stating imprisonment at the
King’s command is “the utter subversion of the choice Liberty and Right
belonging to every free born Subject of this Kingdom.”209 Coke then

201. Impositions were customs duties not approved by Parliament. SOURCES OF OUR
LIBERTIES, supra note 174, at 63.
202. Id. at 62-63 (The British Monarch retained sole authority over these specially created
courts, thereby passing crucial rights secured by the Magna Carta.).
203. See Anthony F. Granucci, “Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted”: The
Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839, 848 (1969).
204. SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 174, at 64.
205. Francis H. Relf, The Petition of Right at 2, reprinted in BULL. UNIV. MINN. (Dec.
1917).
206. SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 174, at 64-65.
207. Id.
208. Id. (citing I HISTORICAL COLLECTIONS 552 (John Rushworth ed., 1721)).
209. Id. at 66.
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introduced a bill limiting the ability of the Crown to detain a person prior
to trial and calling for “due process of law” before punishment.210
The House of Commons unanimously passed the provision but the
House of Lords objected insisting the right of imprisonment for reasons of
state was an essential part of the royal prerogative and should be preserved:
As touching his Majesty’s Royal Prerogative, intrinsical to his
Sovereignty, and betrusted him withal from God, ad communem
totius populi salutem, & non ad destructionem, That his Majesty
would resolve not to use or divert the same, to the prejudice of
any his loyal People in the propriety of their Goods, or liberty of
their Persons: And in case, for the security of his Majesty's Royal
Person, the common safety of his People, or the peaceable
Government of this Kingdom, his Majesty shall find just cause for
reason of State to imprison or restrain any man's Person, his
Majesty would graciously Declare, That within a convenient time
he shall, and will express the cause of the Commitment or
restraint, either General or Special; and upon a cause so expressed,
will leave him immediately to be tried according to the common
Justice of the Kingdom.211
Coke disapproved, arguing that the Lords position rendered the liberties
of the realm’s subjects dependent on an “act of grace on the part of the king
instead of” an inherent right, which the subjects could demand.212 The
House of Lords withdrew their demands and approved Coke’s draft of the
Petition of Right thereby placing Charles at odds with a unified
Parliament.213 Charles consulted with his judges who advised him that
assenting to the Petition of Right would “acknowledge the illegality of his
former conduct and” restrict the powers he formerly assumed.214
He again attempted to side-step the petition by renewing his promise to
respect the liberties of all his subjects, but Parliament insisted on acceptance
which was finally given on June 7, 1628.215
210. Id. at 65-66.
211. John Rushworth, Historical Collections: 1628 (part 2 of 7), BRITISH HISTORY ONLINE,
http://www.british-history.ac.uk/rushworth-papers/vol1/pp538-549 (last visited Dec. 14,
2017) (emphasis added).
212. SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 178, at 67; SAMUEL RAWSON GARDINER,
HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM THE ACCESSION OF JAMES I TO THE OUTBREAK OF THE CIVIL WAR
1601-1642, 261 (1899).
213. Id. at 69.
214. Id.
215. Id.
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The Petition of Right greatly strengthened the writ of habeas corpus by
prohibiting imprisonment at the King’s command without just cause and
also strengthened due process of law by prohibiting the trial of civilians by
tribunals formed in accordance with martial law.216 Moreover, these steps
implied that the King, and perhaps the state itself, were subject to some
form of higher law.
These written and acknowledged protections, however, were
immediately challenged by Charles who dissolved Parliament, not calling
another for eleven years.217 The King also expanded his use of the Star
Chamber to imprison his enemies.218
By 1640, King Charles I was in desperate need of funds to prosecute the
second Bishops War in Scotland which necessitated his summons of

216. The prohibition of civilian trial by courts-martial was first addressed when
Parliament annulled the attainder of the Earl of Lancaster and the principle was repeated in
the English Mutiny Act of 1689. These principles are reflected in Article III and
Amendments V and VI of the Constitution guaranteeing the right to trial by jury and due
process of law. Speaking to martial law, the United States Supreme Court has said,
As necessity creates the rule, so it limits its duration; for, if this government is
continued after the courts are reinstated, it is a gross usurpation of power.
Martial rule can never exist where the courts are open, and in proper and
unobstructed exercise of their jurisdiction. It is also confined to the locality of
actual war.
Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 127 (1866). See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3. The Petition of Right
also prohibited the quartering of soldiers in private homes. “They do therefore humbly pray
your most excellent Majesty . . . would be pleased to remove the said solders and mariners,
and that your people may not be so burthened in time to come.” PETITION OF RIGHT art. X, cl.
4 (1628), reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 178, at 75. Nevertheless,
Parliament in 1765, at the request of General Gage, passed the Quartering Act to aid in
enforcing the Stamp Act. SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 178, at 72. The Quartering
Act allowed the quartering of troops on private property. Id. In 1774 Parliament passed a
new Quartering Act, again providing that British troops could be quartered in the private
homes of the colonists. Id. The Act was considered one of the “Intolerable Acts” and was one
of the grievances cited in the Declaration of Independence. Id. The King “has combined with
others to subject us to a jurisdiction foreign to our constitution, and unacknowledged by our
laws; giving his assent to their acts of pretended legislation: For quartering large bodies of
armed troops among us.” DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 14-15 (U.S. 1776). Such
conduct is prohibited in the Third Amendment. “No Soldier shall, in time of peace be
quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a
manner to be prescribed by law.” U.S. CONST. amend. III.
217. This period is known as the “Eleven Years Tyranny.” Eleven Years Tyranny, OXFORD
REFERENCE, http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095746958
(last visited Feb. 11, 2018).
218. Id.
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Parliament for the first time in eleven years.219 Parliament, first meeting on
April 13, 1640, focused less on funding the King’s war than stating
grievances against the King.220 Parliament did set aside May 7 to debate the
Scottish issue.221 Charles rightly suspected Parliament on that date would
pass a petition against the war and dissolved Parliament two days before the
scheduled debate.222
Scottish resisters, emboldened by Charles’s dissolution of Parliament,
invaded northern England in November, forcing Charles to once again call
Parliament in order to raise funds for his army. Parliament acted boldly and
swiftly to diminish the power of the crown, “swe[eping] away the
machinery of conciliar government developed by the Tudors and early
Stuarts”223 and, in the process, abolishing the Star Chamber.224
Initially, under the reign of Elizabeth I, the Star Chamber protected
persons oppressed by corrupt nobility.225 But, by the time of James I, in his
exercise of his Divine Right and the Royal Prerogative, the court turned
oppressive, imposing penalties not authorized by law.226 James’ conduct
drew the rebuke of the King’s Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas,
Edward Coke.227 Coke informed him “[t]hat the King by his proclamation
cannot create any offence which was not an offence before” and “[t]hat the
King hath no prerogative but that which the law of the land allows him.”228
King James didn’t flinch, but continued, after condemning Coke, to use
the extraordinary powers of the Star Chamber to impose cruel sentences on
219. Short
Parliament,
ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Short-Parliament (last visited Feb. 11, 2018) (Conflict
arose from Charles’s efforts to impose Anglican liturgy on the Church of Scotland.).
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. Concerns about the improper dissolution of legislative bodies were consistently
articulated by colonialists leading up to the American Revolution.
BRITANNICA,
223. Long
Parliament,
ENCYCLOPEDIA
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Long-Parliament (last visited Feb. 11, 2018).
224. The Star Chamber designated the room in Westminster Palace where the King’s
Privy Council, and later the Star Camber Court met as a judicial body. See SOURCES OF OUR
LIBERTIES, supra note 178, at 127.
225. SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 178, at 128.
226. Id. at 130.
227. Coke, at various times, was a member of the King’s Privy Council, served on the Star
Chamber and served in the House of Commons. Gareth H. Jones, Sir Edward Coke: English
Jurist, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Edward-Coke
(last visited Apr. 17, 2018).
228. J.R. TANNER, ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY,
1603-1689, 38 (1928).
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his opponents.229 The Star Chamber’s exercise of power effectively neutered
the Magna Carta. The Star Chamber Court could punish jurors who
returned verdicts unfavorable to the King, compel the accused to answer
under oath, retain jurisdiction to punish any person consistent with the
King’s prerogative,230 and exercise legislative and executive functions
through its ability to enforce its proclamations.231
Parliament, in 1641, decided to use Charles vulnerability from the
Bishops War to abolish the Star Chamber Court and another prerogative
court, the Court of High Commission, thereby more firmly establishing due
process of law and forwarding the development of the right against selfincrimination232 and the prevention of the cruel punishments imposed by
the court,233 and the use of the Court of High Commission by Charles I to
punish theological opponents.234
The struggle between Parliament and the monarchy erupted in war in
1642.235 In 1649, Charles I was executed and the Commonwealth of
England, governed by Parliament and an English Council of State, was
established.236 In 1653, Oliver Cromwell was named Lords Protector and
ruled England, advised by the Council of State, until his death in 1658.237
His son Richard succeeded him, but Royalists successfully restored the
House of Stuart when Charles II assumed the throne on May 29, 1660.238
In 1689, Parliament had new and lingering grievances with the monarchy
and used the weakness of King James II to offer the crown to William of
Orange and his wife Mary on condition that they assent to a Declaration of
Rights.239 This would later be followed by Parliament’s passage of the
English Bill of Rights.240 Parliament requested William’s aid in deposing

229. SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 178, at 130-31.
230. Id. at 129.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 132.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 136.
235. Oliver Cromwell, HISTORY.COM (2009), http://www.history.com/topics/britishhistory/oliver-cromwell (last visited Feb. 10, 2018).
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 178, at 222-24.
240. Id.
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King James to restore “English liberties and [deliver] the realm from the
absolutism of James II.”241
The English Bill of Rights, much like the United States Declaration of
Independence, begins with a list of grievances against the monarchy.
Paragraphs 10-12 lay the foundation for the prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishments:
10. And excessive bail hath been required of persons committed
in criminal cases, to elude the benefit of the laws made for
the liberty of the subjects.
11. And excessive fines have been imposed; and illegal and cruel
punishments inflicted.
12. And several grants and promises made of fines and
forfeitures, before any conviction or judgment against the
persons, upon whom the same were to be levied.242
These grievances emanated from pre- and post-conviction punishment
used for improper purposes. The monarchy had detained persons by
excessive bail to coerce confessions, used torture to obtain evidence,
imposed unusual and excessive sentences on its enemies, and threatened
extreme punishment to coerce cooperation.243 All of this conduct was
considered cruel and unusual and illegal by Parliament.244 “All which are
utterly and directly contrary to the known laws and statutes, and freedom of
this realm.”245
“The prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments was based on the
longstanding principle of English law that the punishment should fit the
crime. That is, the punishment should not be, by reason of its excessive
length or severity, greatly disproportionate to the offense charged.”246
Clause 10 in the English Bill of Rights provides “[t]hat excessive bail ought

241. Id. at 222.
242. ENG. BILL OF RIGHTS (1689), reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 178,
at 246.
243. See e.g., Mirjan Damaska, The Death of Legal Torture (Book Review), 87 YALE L.J.
860, 865 (1978)[hereinafter Damaska].
244. See generally John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of "Unusual": The Eighth
Amendment as a Bar to Cruel Innovation, 102 NW. U.L. REV. 1739, 1786 (2008){hereinafter
Stinneford].
245. ENG. BILL OF RIGHTS (1689), reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 178,
at 246.
246. SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 178, at 236.
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not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed; nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted.”247
It is notable that the prohibition against excessive fines addressed, in
addition to concerns about disproportionate punishment, the use of large
fines to coerce proof in the form of a confession. Fines and torture as modes
of proof were long condemned in England, in contrast to continental
Europe.248 The fact that the prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishments was also directed to prevent punishing the morally innocent
has profound implications to originalist interpretations of the Eighth
Amendment. Punishment and torture, as well as excessive amercements or
fines, were used as a means of proof in order to coerce confessions for the
political purposes of the crown.249 Using the individual, or freeman, as a
means by the King to achieve his goals offended the inherent rights of
English subjects.250
Because of this Act, the Royal prerogative was greatly diminished as the
King was prohibited from suspending laws,251 prosecuting members of

247. ENG. BILL OF RIGHTS (1689), reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 178,
at 247.
248. See generally Damaska, supra note 243.
249. See, e.g., Ellen Castelow, Torture in the Tower of London, HISTORIC UK,
http://www.historic-uk.com/HistoryUK/HistoryofEngland/Torture-in-the-Tower-ofLondon/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2018).
250. Although a thorough analysis of the Eighth Amendment is beyond the scope of this
article, I posit that the English struggles and America’s founding are rightly focused on
justifying and thereby limiting the state’s power to coerce and punish. In this context,
punishment is not viewed cleanly through originalist tools, procedural due process, or
methods of punishment as such generally emphasize procedure over substance. Rather,
history reveals the battle was not over methods or procedures of punishment but rather
under what circumstances it was proper to punish. The long and incessant struggle of justice
is to prevent the punishment of the morally innocent. For this reason, the state’s punishment
of the innocent by imprisonment violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel
(using the individual as a means for state concerns) and unusual (disregarding the inquiry
into the moral blameworthiness of the accused) punishment. In terms of the evolving
standards of decency, the test used by the current majority of the Supreme Court, punishing
the innocent is grossly disproportionate. See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59-60
(2010). Graham articulates the “grossly disproportionate” standard but the Court has not
held that strict liability crimes violate the Eighth Amendment and has expressly rejected that
such public welfare crimes violate due process. Id. The full argument that imposing prison
sentences violates the Constitution awaits another paper.
251. See ENG. BILL OF RIGHTS (1689), reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note
178, at 246.
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Parliament,252 impaneling jurors of the King’s choosing in cases of high
treason,253 and again abolishing the Court of High Commission.254
Innocent persons were also protected by other provisions of the Act.
Torture, or cruel punishment through trial by ordeal, was prohibited,
according to Lord Coke, by Chapter 29 of the Magna Carta255 and by
Parliament through statute in 1219,256 and its use continued to offend in
1689.
Despite its continued use by Royal prerogative, by the early seventeenthcentury, torture was viewed as by English jurists as representing the
unusual, or foreign, practice of the civil law of continental Europe257 as
“[o]ne of the distinguishing features of the English common law writing,
from its earliest inception, was its rejection of torture as a method of
proof.”258 And yet, through the exercise of the Royal Prerogative, torture
continued.259
Parliament, in the English Bill of Rights, again found it necessary to
declare its prohibition as a means of proof by prohibiting the use of
excessive fines and cruel and unusual punishments.260 Punishing the
innocent through such devices was viewed as unjustified. The guilty, on the
other hand, faced punishments we would view as barbarous today. Men
convicted of treason were disemboweled alive and drawn and quartered
while women faced burning at the stake.261
Clearly, the English Bill of Rights was concerned as much with protecting
the morally innocent from being used as a tool of the state as it was with the

252. Id. at 247.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 226. The Court’s Chief Commissioner, Lord Jeffreys, used the High
Commission to place Oxford and Cambridge Universities under Catholic control. Id.
at
226-27.
255. SIR EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND:
CONCERNING HIGH TREASON, AND OTHER PLEAS OF THE CROWN, AND CRIMINAL CAUSES, 34-37
(1797).
256. Danny Friedman, Torture and the Common Law, 2 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 180, 182
(2006).
257. Id. at 186; see also JAMES HEATH, TORTURE AND ENGLISH LAW: AN ADMINISTRATIVE
AND LEGAL HISTORY FROM THE PLANTAGENETS TO THE STUARTS 38-45 (1982).
258. Friedman, supra note 255, at 184.
259. Id. at 187-92.
260. ENG. BILL OF RIGHTS (1689), reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 178,
at 247.
261. See supra note 63.
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methods of punishment applied to the guilty.262 “[T]here can be no
transgression” where there is no will to commit an offense, “[a]nd because
the liberty . . . presupposeth an act of the understanding . . . , it follows that
where there is a total defect of the understanding, there is no free act of the
will in the choice of things or actions” and, therefore, no transgression.263
These English struggles, in hindsight, were centered on individual liberty
and equality, and when and whether the state had a right to coerce or
punish the individual. This issue was masked by individual ambitions as a
struggle primarily about the form of government. Despite asserting
individual liberty, Parliamentarians were often content to bring the
monarchy under the rule of law, as stated by Parliament, while not creating
a law superior to Parliament and the state itself. Yet, they spoke aspirational
language of a superior law. The American revolution gave full expression to
these aspirations.
IV. THE AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARIES ELEVATE EQUALITY AND
INDIVIDUALISM ABOVE THE STATE EVEN AS THE FOUNDATION IS LAID FOR
THE UTILITARIAN ASSAULT ON THE INDIVIDUAL.
A. The American Revolutionaries Lift Man’s Inherent Rights above the
State, Subjecting the State to the Rule of Law.
The struggle between Parliamentary Supremacy and the Divine Right of
Kings was not central to American colonialists, who were fleeing religious
persecution, whether unjustly imposed by the monarchy or Parliament.
Colonial charters generally expressed that colonialists retained “all liberties
and Immunities of free and naturall Subjects within any of the Domynions
of Vs, our Heires or Successors, to all Intents, Construccõns, and Purposes
whatsoever, as yf they and everie of them were borne within the Realme of
England.”264
Various statements of rights and proclamations, also considered Acts of
Parliament, or statutes contrary to such rights and privileges, null and void,
thus elevating the status of the individual rights articulated in the Magna
262. See also Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910).
263. Dubin, supra note 7, at 352 (quoting 1 MATTHEW HALE, HISTORIA PLACITORUM
CORONAE: THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 14-15 (1736)).
264. CHARTER OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY (1629), reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES,
supra note 178, at 93. See also CHARTER OF MARYLAND art. X (1632), reprinted in SOURCES OF
OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 178, at 109 (providing that all freemen shall enjoy “all Privileges,
Franchises and Liberties of this our Kingdom of England” and providing that any “Statute,
Act, Ordinance, or Provision to the contrary thereof, notwithstanding.”).
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Carta and Petition of Rights as a form of supreme law of a constitutional
nature.265 Distance and dissatisfaction with the King and Parliament
fomented growing discussion that these rights were inherent, not subject to
the grace of Parliament or the King.
America did not adopt British Parliamentary Supremacy, for once it
gained supremacy, Parliament utilized the methods of the monarchy to
enforce conformance on the colonies with the passage of the Intolerable
Acts.266 On October 25, 1774 the First Continental Congress petitioned
King George III, articulating grievances against Parliament that mirror
Parliament’s earlier complaints against the monarchy:
[J]udges of the courts of common law have been made entirely
dependent on one part [of] the legislature for their salaries as
well as for the duration of their commissions. Councilors,
holding their commissions during pleasure, exercise legislative
authority. Assemblies have been frequently and injuriously
dissolved. . . .
....
By several acts of Parliament . . .
the powers of admiralty and vice-admiralty courts are extended
beyond their ancient limits . . .
the trial by jury in many civil cases is abolished;
enormous forfeitures are incurred for slight offenses;
....
oppressive security is required from owners before they are
allowed to defend their rights.
. . . Parliament ha[s] resolved that the colonists may be tried in
England for offenses alleged to have been committed in America
. . . .267
When King George rejected America’s petitions, the Continental
Congress turned its ire on the King, justifying a declaration of
independence due to the King’s “repeated injuries and usurpations, all

265. THE CHARTER OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY (1629) reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES,
supra note 178, at 82; THE CHARTER OF MARYLAND (1632) reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR
LIBERTIES, supra note 178, at 105.
266. Intolerable Acts: Great Britain [1774], ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/event/Intolerable-Acts (last visited Apr. 17, 2018).
267. First Continental Congress, Petition to King George III (1774),
http://americainclass.org/sources/makingrevolution/crisis/text7/petitionkinggeorge3.pdf
(last visited Feb. 11, 2018).
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having in direct object of the establishment of an absolute tyranny over
these States.”268
American revolutionaries were not as concerned with the English battle
over the form of government as much as they were concerned that any form
of government be subject to the rule of law and to fundamental principles
respecting individual liberty.269 This purpose directed their formation of
their government, but its form was not their purpose.
And the Founders used experience to condemn the King and Parliament
for their excessive use of power in defiance of liberty by drawing on “(1)
their rights as Englishmen; (2) natural law; (3) the emigration contract; (4)
the original contract; (5) the original American contract; (6) the emigration
purchase; (7) colonial charters; (8) equality with other British subjects . . . ;
(9) principles of the British constitution; and (10) principles of the
customary American constitution.”270 In other words, any source that
limited the state’s reach.
The United States Bill of Rights articulated procedural barriers to that
exercise of state power and principles that prohibited its exercise, thus
expressing the radical individualism and equality reflected in the gospels
which guided the development of common law criminal theory.
Mens rea and actus rea is not directly addressed in the Constitution
because it was inherent in the definition of crime and moral understanding
of the time.
In 1816, when reversing the conviction of letting a carriage out for hire
on Sunday, the Connecticut Supreme Court opined that if “a man acts
honestly . . . he is not a criminal. . . . Unless this construction be adopted, a
man may be convicted of a crime, when he had no intent to violate the law. .
. . This would oppugn the maxim that a criminal intent is essential to
constitute a crime.”271
In the colonies, individualism and equality before the law were
sufficiently culturally entrenched that the concept of the state criminally
punishing the morally innocent was abhorrent to the concept of law and
individual liberties.

268. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
269. This recognition is important in that it calls into question the legitimacy of Justice
Scalia’s originalism, confining the intent of America’s founders to the forms and procedures
of government and refusing to contemplate the documents aspirational qualities.
270. JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION 293 (1996) (citation omitted).
271. Myers v. State, 1 Conn. 502, 504 (1816).
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B. Jefferson Sees the Seeds of Despotism in America’s Law Schools.
Yet, even at that time, Thomas Jefferson saw signs that the liberty of
America’s citizens was in jeopardy because of a new textbook in America’s
law schools. Although, some have referred to Blackstone’s Commentaries as
the “handbook of the American revolutionary”272 and Blackstone wrote
eloquently on the necessity of mens rea,273 Jefferson saw within Blackstone’s
writings the seed of despotism. Blackstone was out of step with the fullness
of American individualism and equality.
Jefferson identified Republicanism with the Whig Party, which opposed
absolute monarchy, as against the Tory Party which originally supported
such. Moreover, in the middle seventeenth century, during Lord Coke’s
prominence, the Tories resisted religious toleration.274 Tory conservatism,
adherence to tradition, parliamentary supremacy, and religious intolerance
was—in Jefferson’s estimate—embodied in William Murray, First Earl of
Mansfield, better known as Lord Mansfield.275
Mansfield served as Chief Justice of the King’s Bench and Solicitor
General and secured a “rigid dogma that saw any threat or challenge to
British authority or culture as inherently illegitimate . . . and he immediately
rejected the earliest complaints of the Americans over British rule.”276
Colonials ascribed to him an “arbitrary, unconstitutional, and tyrannical
posture toward everything.”277
Jefferson, writing to James Madison on February 17, 1826, lamented the
substitution in American’s law schools of William Blackstone’s
Commentaries, first published in 1770, in place of Edward Coke’s

272. Stinneford, supra note 244, at 1786; see also Briehl v. Dulles, 248 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir.
1957); ROBERT LOWRY CLINTON, GOD AND MAN IN THE LAW: THE FOUNDATIONS OF ANGLOAMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 92 (1997).
273. See supra p. 12.
274. See Whig and Tory: Historical Political Party England, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Whig-Party-England (last visited Feb. 12, 2018).
275. See ARI HELO, THOMAS JEFFERSON’S ETHICS AND THE POLITICS OF HUMAN PROGRESS:
THE MORALITY OF A SLAVEHOLDER 142-43 (2014); CLAUDE HALSTEAD VAN TYNE, THE CAUSES
OF THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE, BEING THE FIRST VOLUME OF A HISTORY OF THE FOUNDING OF
THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 218 (1922).
276. Henry Nicholas Buehner, Manfsfieldism: Law and Politics in Anglo-America 17001865,
Abstract
(unpublished
Ph.D.
dissertation,
Temple
University),
http://digital.library.temple.edu/cdm/ref/collection/p245801coll10/id/258169.
277. Id.; see also Stinneford, supra note 243, at 1786.
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Institutes278 as the premier American legal textbook.279 “[B]efore the
[American] revolution, Coke Littleton [the title of the first volume of Coke’s
Institutes] was the universal elementary book of law students, and a
sounder [W]hig280 never wrote, nor profounder learning in the orthodox
doctrines of the British [C]onstitution, or in what were called English
liberties,”281 Jefferson wrote.
As for Blackstone, Jefferson labelled his legal theory “honeyed
Manfieldism.”282 In other words, Blackstone believed in state supremacy
through the exercise of its authority. This belief that representative
government, or democracy, is inherently virtuous deeply concerned
Jefferson. Limiting the national government and ensuring individual liberty
was foremost in Jefferson’s mind as he discussed the founding of the
University of Virginia School of Law with Madison.
“In the selection of our Law Professor, we must be rigorously attentive to
his political principles,” he wrote.283 Use of Blackstone’s hornbook started
the
slide into toryism, and nearly all of your young brood of lawyers
now are of that hue. They . . . no longer know what whigism or
republicanism means. It is in our seminary that that vestal flame
is to be kept alive; it is thence it is to spread anew over our own
and the sister States. If we are true and vigilant in our trust,
within a dozen or twenty years a majority of our own legislature
will be from one school, and many disciples will have carried its
doctrines home with them to their several States, and will have
leavened thus the whole mass.284

278. Coke’s 4 Volumes of the Institutes of the Lawes of England, was published from
1628-1644.
Coke, Sir Edward [1552-1634], ONLINE LIBRARY OF LIBERTY,
https://oll.libertyfund.org/pages/coke-sir-edward-1552-1634 (last modified Apr. 13, 2016).
279. 12 THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 456 (Paul Leicester Ford
ed., 1905), http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/jefferson-the-works-of-thomas-jefferson-12-vols
(last visited Feb. 12, 2018).
280. The British Whig party opposed absolutism. See e.g., Whig and Tory: Historical
BRITANNICA,
Political
Party,
England,
ENCYCLOPEDIA
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Whig-Party-England (last visited Apr. 17, 2018).
281. 10 THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 376, (Paul Leicester
Ford ed., 1899).
282. Stinneford, supra note 244, at 1786.
283. JEFFERSON, supra note 278, at 456.
284. Id.
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Jefferson’s concern about Blackstone predated his letter to Madison. In
1814, he wrote, “Blackstone and Hume . . . are making Tories of those
young [lawyers] . . . . These two books . . . have done more towards the
suppression of the liberties of man than all the millions of men in arms of
Bonaparte . . . .”285
Throughout Jefferson’s lifetime, the various denominations of
Christianity and the Catholic Church, at times, stood against the official
religion of the state, and served as a training ground for those dedicated to
individual liberty and tolerance. In England, whiggism sought to limit the
King’s power, and in America, it became republicanism which stressed
inalienable rights.286
Mansfield’s, and Blackstone’s, support of the state and the state’s coercive
policies in support of the official state church, the Anglican Church,
remained a harbinger of the loss of liberty and the rise of absolutism.
Jefferson viewed both the Divine Right of Kings and Parliamentary
Supremacy as offensive to inherent rights and lived at a time when the state
often used religion to forward its cause. At the same time, Jefferson
recognized the inspiration Christian faith offered to the long struggle
against unjust state power. He, therefore, logically viewed the marriage of
state and religion as offensive to liberty while viewing the cultural absence
of faith also threatening. And so, he nurtured fear that the state may merge
with the church, while nurturing hope that our seminaries would continue
its teaching of the radical equality and liberty of the individual.
Jefferson’s criticism of Blackstone was not without merit. Blackstone was
a champion of Parliamentary Supremacy. “[T]he legislature, being in truth
the sovereign power, is always . . . of absolute authority.”287 It “hath
sovereign and uncontrollable authority in making, confirming, enlarging,
restraining, abrogating, repealing, reviving and expounding of laws . . . this
being the place where that absolute despotic power, which must in all
governments reside somewhere, is entrusted.”288
“Like James I, Milton, Halifax, and Hobbes, Blackstone asserted, as a
matter of logic, the sovereign must possess uncontrolled absolute, and
arbitrary power.”289 This was opposed to the views of Lord Coke, that judges

285. Alschuler, supra note 8, at 11.
286. Stinneford, supra note 244, at 1786 (citing GEORGE HERBERT GUTTRIDGE, ENGLISH
WHIGGISM AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 10, 68 (1974)).
287. Id. at 1789 (citation omitted).
288. Id. (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *160).
289. Id.
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could disregard legislation inconsistent with reason or foundational rights290
and that positive law inconsistent with the principles of common law are
void.291
Yet, Blackstone’s seeds, watered by legal positivism and the fervor of the
Second Great Awakening, grew into the legal doctrine of Public Welfare
Crimes.292 Close to one century later, and three decades after Jefferson’s
warnings, strict liability crimes, placing the state’s interest above the
individual, began appearing consistently in the United States overwhelming
common law protections of the innocent.293
C. Legal Positivism, the Separation of Law from Morality and Metaphysics,
Takes Root in the Second Great Awakening.
Jeremy Bentham first posited that the law is dependent on social facts,
and not morality, in the late eighteenth century, and the concept was
further developed by John Austin in 1832.294 In its first expressions,
positivism was similar to theories of state supremacy in its requirement of a
“sovereign” with “supreme and absolute de facto power” joined with the
ability to command conformity “backed up by threat of force or
‘sanction.’”295
This definition of law places an emphasis on procedures ensuring that
the proper authority enacts laws as the source of legitimacy. This sourcebased focus offers nothing regarding the purposes or merits of law, as such
are considered by postivists, at least initially, irrelevant. “No legal positivist
argues that the systemic validity of law establishes its moral validity, i.e., that
it should be obeyed by subjects or applied by judges.”296
But Bentham’s articulation of utilitarianism corresponded with the
growing use of the scientific method and the temptation to utilize the

290. Alschuler, supra note 8, at 19 n.106.
291. See Dr. Bonham’s Case, 8 Co. Rep. 114 (1610). Both Royalists and radical democrats
used Coke’s reasoning in Dr. Bonham’s Case to argue acts “against common right or reason”
were void. See DAVID JENKINS, DISCOURSE TOUCHING INCONVENIENCES OF A LONGCONTINUED PARLIAMENT 123 (1647); J.W. GOUGH, FUNDAMENTAL LAW IN ENGLISH
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 104 (Fred. B. Rothman Publ’ns 1985) (quoting JENKINS, supra note
290, at 123)
292. Sayre, supra note 48, at 56-57.
293. Id.
294. See Leslie Green, Legal Positivism, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Jan. 3,
2003), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-positivism#1.
295. Id.
296. Id.
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method to determine not only what “is” but also what “ought” to be.297
Bentham’s insistent empiricism298 in determining “moral” applications of
hedonism misuses the scientific method to determine what “ought” to be
and fills the void of legal positivism.
Science, properly, requires observing what is measureable and rejects that
which is non-observable or not measureable (non-sensible).299 Accordingly,
metaphysics, today, has no influence on science unless it can be reduced to
material, or atoms. The danger presents when this method purports to be
the only valid description of reality thereby attempting to posit an answer to
what “ought” to be through a consequentialist moral construct, or what
“will be” through determinism. When it does so, science presupposes that
God does not, or cannot, work through matter and thereby applies a
metaphysics it purports to reject. This confusion, the application of morals
objectives to science, mirrors the confusion of attempting to contemplate
law without contemplating its purpose or merits.
The debate is not new. Plato’s Athenian lamented his “youthful
irreligion” arising from a naturalistic view.300 As a youth, he stated that he
held the predominant view—that “all that is in in the heaven, as well as
animals and all plants, and all the seasons come from these elements [that
is, fire and water, earth and air], not by the action of mind, as they say, or of
any God, or from art, but, as I was saying, nature and chance only.”301 This
determinism is mirrored by science when it claims province over all that
exists.
As philosopher John R. Seale writes:
The world consists entirely of entities that we find it convenient,
though not entirely accurate, to describe as particles. These
particles exist in fields of force, and are organized into systems.
The boundaries of [these] systems are set by causal relations. . . .
Types of living systems evolve through natural selection, and
297. See supra notes 36 and 81 (discussing the “ought-is” dilemma).
298. See, e.g., William Sweet, Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHIL., http://www.iep.utm.edu/bentham/ (last visited Apr. 25, 2018). Although Bentham
viewed the creation of law as prima facie diminishing the greater happiness, he also viewed
law as a necessity for societal order and individual rights as acquired from law and not preexisting. Bentham, thereby, helped re-open the door to Blackstone’s doctrine of state
supremacy.
299. Interestingly, we are learning that the very act of measurement matter alters that
matter such that we are currently unable, with exact precision, to measure anything.
300. PLATO, THE LAWS 889c-892c [hereinafter THE LAWS]. Although, the Athenian came
to his “senses” recognizing the significance of the pre-existing soul.
301. Id.

2018]

IMPRISONING THE INNOCENT

449

some of them have evolved certain sorts of cellular structures,
specifically, nervous systems capable of causing and sustaining
consciousness. Consciousness is a biological, and therefore
physical, though of course also mental feature of certain higherlevel nervous systems, such as human brains and a large number
of different types of animal brains.302
Seale adds, “[T]he truth is . . . our metaphysics is derived from physics.”303
One of materialisms’ greatest challenges is to explain the subjective
mental state and consciousness of a human being. Desperate to shut the
door on subjectivity, lest metaphysics sneak back in the discussion,
materialists have forwarded three approaches to reject the relevance of
metaphysics. They attempt “to show how statements about mental states
can be analysed [sic] into statements . . . about physical states [or they]
courageous[ly] and desperate[ly] [claim] statements about states of
consciousness [are] false [or] . . . attempt to show that materialism can
accommodate irreducibly subjective psychical [sic] states without ceasing to
be genuinely materialistic.”304
Regardless of the approach, we are left in a soulless state.
In science, Luigi Giussani observes, “Even the most noble expressions of
the human experience are rendered banal, commonplace . . . . [T]he entire
phenomenon of love is reduced, with bitter ease, to biological fact.”305
Frederick Nietzsche captures the calamity befalling man’s nature with the
death of metaphysics, or the death of god, with the ranting of his madman
in the square.
God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him.
How shall we comfort ourselves, the murderers of all murderers?
What was holiest and mightiest of all that the world has yet
owned has bled to death under our knives: who will wipe this
blood off us? What water is there for us to clean ourselves? What
festivals of atonement, what sacred games shall we have to
invent? Is not the greatness of this deed too great for us? Must we
ourselves not become gods simply to appear worthy of it?306

302. JOHN R. SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 6 (1995). See also Quandary,
supra note 36, at 26-28 (detailing the reductionism of materialistic science).
303. Searle, supra note 301, at 6.
304. HOWARD ROBINSON, MATTER AND SENSE 2 (1982).
305. LUIGI GIUSSANI, THE RELIGIOUS SENSE 42 (John Zucchi trans., 1997).
306. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE GAY SCIENCE: Book III —Aphorism #125 (1887).
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Removing God from the inquiry defeats the reason to inquire in the first
place. God exists, or we will proclaim ourselves as gods to fill the vacuum.
All that is left is to determine what is right by whomever has the greatest
power. Nietzsche was acutely aware of this result; however, Bentham was
not, and legal positivists still aren’t.
D. Rejecting Metaphysics is a Rejection of Justice.
Just as Holmes rejected the “brooding omnipresence in the sky,” Judge
Richard Posner “laments that judges and the law do not look to empirical
information to resolve issues, but rather look to moral principles.”307
“Holmes and his successors operated in an era that was determined to
purge itself of ‘metaphysics.’”308 “It would not be much of a stretch . . . to say
that the central effort from Holmes through the modern proponents of
‘policy science’ has been precisely to improve the law by ridding it of the
curse of metaphysics.”309
Defining something without reference to purpose defeats the very reason
for seeking the definition—that of gaining an understanding of its function.
On the one hand, we have an amoral datum called law, which has
the peculiar quality of creating a moral duty to obey it. On the
other hand, we have a moral duty to do what we think is right
and decent. When we are confronted by a statute we believe to be
thoroughly evil, we have to choose between these two duties.
If this is the positivist position, then I have no hesitancy in
rejecting it.310
Here, Lon Fuller, although a positivist, recognizes the dilemma.
Law is “justice-apt . . . . [I]t always makes sense to ask whether law is just
. . . . Law stands continuously exposed to demands for justification.”311 The
law’s purpose is justice, and justice is a metaphysical question that is not
value neutral.
Purpose is intrinsic to creation, as it is to any endeavor by a rational
being. To describe law solely from form entirely focused on what “is,”
without considering purpose is akin to designing a car, or anything for that
307. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (2017) (Holmes, J., dissenting);
Quandary, supra note 36, at 1.
308. Quandary, supra note 36, at xi.
309. Id. at 2–3.
310. Lon Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L.
REV. 630, 656 (1958).
311. Green, supra note 293.
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matter, without seeking first to understand the purpose of its creation. A car
purposed to go fast will look much different than a car purposed to
transport a family safely to a new destination. The exercise is fruitless and
the human condition will not withstand the vacuum.
So we fill the void, often by declaring ourselves or our institutions as
gods. As did Bentham with the consequentialist moral construct of
utilitarianism, granting the trait of virtue to democracy.312
Social scientists, inspired by the materialism of Darwin, also rushed the
fill the void left by the law’s refusal to consider metaphysical concepts like
justice and developed justification for state tyranny. Ernst Haeckel (18341919), biologist, physician and professor, wrote in 1877 that evolution
exposes the illusory nature of free will and that the “golden rule”313 is rooted
in “a natural science basis,”314 foretelling the loss of soul and human agency
in a world of materialism. Austrian parliamentarian Batholomaus von
Caneri, argued “the value of Darwin is that the human no longer needs to
have a supernatural soul, and that one no longer needs purpose to explain
creation.”315 Therefore, “[a]n ethic consistent with Darwin’s theory knows
no natural or innate rights, and therefore, only speaks of acquired rights.”316
We believe that the evolution of the human species as well as all
other species is perhaps only possible—and in any case
furthered—through natural selection, and that the struggle for
existence shapes in its widest sense all of human history as well as
the existence of the most obscure individual; and (the struggle
for existence) is the basis for all phenomena of politics as well as
social life. That is our worldview. From this flows all our
principles of life and our conceptions of law and morality.317
The individual is miniscule, next to the power of the state in the “struggle
for existence.” Thus, purpose as defined by science, reduces the individual
312. Democracy without constraint is merely two wolves and a sheep deciding what’s for
dinner. An observation attributed to Benjamin Franklin.
313. The golden rule, “do unto others you would have them do unto you” has its origins
in Jesus’s command to “do to others as you would have them do to you.” Matthew 7:12
(NIV); see also Luke 6:31. It is also reflected in Kant’s “Categorical Imperative.”
314. Ernst Haeckel, Ueber die heutige Entwickelungslehre im Verhaltnisse zur
Gesamtwissenschaft, in AMTLICHER BERICHT DER 50, 1877, at 19-20.
315. Letter from Bartholomaus von Carneri to Ernst Haeckel and Fridrish Jodl (Sept. 4,
1883).
316. Id.
317. MAX NORDAU, DIE KONVENTIONELLEN LUGEN DER KULTURMENSCHHEIT 26 (Leipzig,
1909).
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and elevates the state. But its work was not done, as it developed further
tools to undermine moral arguments for recognizing the intrinsic value of
the individual.
Good and bad derive not only their existence but their measure
and their significance from the views of the community. They are
therefore not absolute but variable; they are not an immutable
standard amid the ever-changing conditions of humanity . . . but
are subject to the laws of evolution in society and therefore in a
constant state of flux . . . . What is virtue here and now may have
been vice formerly . . . and vice versa.
claimed German physician Max Nordau.318
With history serving as merely a reflection of natural processes which, at
that time of its expression, behind the current evolutionary forces, history’s
lessons are lost and the individual loses a significant weapon against state
hegemony.319 Virtue can no longer be measured and is powerless in
persuasion. It is an illusion. As is justice.
In Mein Kampf, Hitler begins describing the application of such
a worldview, indicating it by no means believes in the equality of
races, but recognizes along with their differences their higher or
lower value, and through this knowledge feels obliged, according
to the eternal will that rules this universe [the survival of the
fittest], to promote the victory of the better, the stronger, and to
demand the submission of the worse and weaker. It embraces
thereby in principle the aristocratic law of nature and believes in
the validity of this law down to the last individual being. It
recognizes not only the different value of races, but also the
different value of individuals. . . . But by no means can it approve
of the right of an ethical idea existing, if this idea is a danger for
the racial life of the bearer of a higher ethic.320
This thinking found fertile ground in the United States, as policy drifted
towards preserving America’s ethnic and genetic heritage. In 1907, Indiana
became the first state to pass forced sterilization to prevent genetic decay321
318. MAX NORDAU, MORALS AND THE EVOLUTION OF MAN 73 (Marie A. Lewenz trans.,
New York, Funk and Wagnalls Co. 1922).
319. See Fridrish Jodl, Morals in History, 1 INT’L J. OF ETHICS 204, 207-08 (1891).
320. A. E. SAMAAN, FROM A RACE OF MASTERS TO A MASTER RACE 521 (2012) (quoting
Adolph Hitler, MEIN KAMPF 420).
321. See, e.g., Indiana Eugenics: History and Legacy 1907-2007, www.iupui.edu/eugenics/.
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and the Eugenics Office of Cold Spring Harbor, New York was founded in
1910, largely funded by the Carnegie and Rockefeller charitable trusts.322
The Eugenics Office encouraged the establishment of “Eugenics Registries,”
such as the registry in Battle Creek, Michigan created for the purposes of
“assit[ing] in the maintenance and increase of natural endowments and to
combat race decay.”323
In 1924 Virginia passed the Preservation of Racial Integrity Act and
Sterilization Act324 promoting the eugenical goals of prohibiting interracial
marriage and allowing forced sterilization of certain persons exhibiting
undesirable genetic traits. Eugenics supporters selected the Virginia’s
sterilization of rape victim Carrie Buck as a test case for the
constitutionality of forced sterilization.325 The eugenicists’ timing was
impeccable.

322. Edwin Black, The Horrifying American Roots of Nazi Eugenics, History News
Network (Sept. 2003), https://historynewsnetwork.org/article/1796.
323. RUTH CLIFFORD ENGS, THE PROGRESSIVE ERA’S HEALTH REFORM MOVEMENT: A
HISTORICAL DICTIONARY 119-20 (2003).
324. See
An
Act
To
Preserve
Racial
Integrity,
http://www2.vcdh.virginia.edu/lewisandclark/students/projects/monacans/Contemporary_
Monacans/racial.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2018); see also Brendan Wolfe, Racial Integrity
VIRGINIA,
Laws
(1924-1930),
ENCYCLOPEDIA
https://www.encyclopediavirginia.org/Racial_Integrity_Laws_of_the_1920s (last visited Apr.
17, 2018).
325. See, e.g., The Supreme Court and the Sterilization of Carrie Buck, FACING HIST. &
OURSELVES,
https://www.facinghistory.org/resource-library/supreme-court-andsterilization-carrie-buck (last visited Apr. 17, 2018). Carrie Buck, who was of average
intelligence, was committed to the Virginia Colony for the Feebleminded at the insistence of
her landlord in order to conceal their son’s rape of Carrie. Carrie’s commitment and
sterilization was partially due to her pregnancy out of wedlock, demonstrating, according to
the State, loose morals. Carrie’s mother, physically abused and abandoned by her husband,
chose prostitution for income, also, according to the state, exhibiting undesirable traits.
Eugenics supporters, therefore, argued that Carrie represented two generations of defective
genes that burdened and threatened the state’s welfare. While committed, Carrie gave birth
to a daughter, the product of the rape. State officials conducted a cursory examination falsely
concluding the child suffered from mental deficiencies, and thus represented a third
generation of undesirables. Carrie was sterilized and her daughter adopted by the parents of
her rapist. In order to receive Supreme Court sanction for eugenical goals, a show trial was
fashioned with Carrie represented by an attorney who supported eugenics thereby satisfying
procedural due process. Id., see also Buck v. Bell: The Test Case for Virginia’s Eugenical
Sterilization Act, U. OF VA. HIST. COLLECTION, http://exhibits.hsl.virginia.edu/eugenics/3buckvbell/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2018). The case was appealed and the United States Supreme
Court in 1927 upheld Virginia’s sterilization policy 8-1 with Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr. writing the majority opinion. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927); see generally ADAM
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In December of 1925, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote his friend,
British MP Harold Laski, suggesting the law’s purpose is to forward the
interests of the state.326 Holmes disdained the constant march of judges into
the foggy marshes of subjective intent and zealously relied on empirical
evidence to assess the law. In the letter, Holmes informed Laski that the
only relief he would provide to an innocent person facing execution is the
comfort of knowing he died as a “good soldier” for his country, serving the
state’s purpose of deterring others from committing the conduct of which
he was innocent, but nevertheless convicted, for “the law must keep its
promises.”327
Holmes, as the Buck case reached the Supreme Court in 1927, was clearly
not concerned with Carrie Buck’s moral innocence, as much as he was
concerned about the state burden she represented. Writing for an 8-1
majority, Holmes announced the state had the inherent authority to prevent
those who “sap the strength” of the state from continuing in their kind and
that “three generations of imbeciles are enough.”328 Buck v. Bell had
ramifications across the Atlantic.
By 1933, Hitler achieved his rise to German political power and in 1935,
initiated his racial policies by ushering the passage of the Nurnberger
Gesetze (Nuremberg Laws). Modeled after Virginia’s Preservation of the
Race Act, the German Law for the Protection of German Blood and Honour
prohibited marriages and intercourse between Jews and Germans, and
forbade the employment of German females under 45 in Jewish
households.329
Many in America applauded Hitler’s racial policies. In 1936, Dr. C.G.
Campbell, Honorary President of the Eugenics Research Association,
keened, “It is unfortunate that the anti-Nazi propaganda with which all
countries have been flooded has gone far to obscure the correct

COHEN, IMBECILES: THE SUPREME COURT, AMERICAN EUGENICS AND THE STERILIZATION OF
CARRIE BUCK (2016).
326. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Letter to Harold Laski (Dec. 19, 1925), in 1 HOLMES-LASKI
LETTERS 806 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Oxford University Press 1953).
327. Id. Holmes felt “no doubt nor scruple” with such a result concluding punishment of
the morally innocent a more efficient legal outcome than being “lost in the maze” of
discerning and accused’s state of mind.
328. Buck, 274 U.S. at 207.
329. Law for the Protection of German Blood and German Honor §§ 2, 3, HOLOCAUST
EDUCATION
&
ARCHIVE
RESEARCH
TEAM
(Sept.
15,
1935),
http://www.holocaustresearchproject.org/holoprelude/pbgh.html.
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understanding and the great importance of German racial policy . . . . No
earnest eugenicist can fail to give approbation to such a national policy.”330
But after World War II, and after the full implications of elevating the
state above human dignity were understood, the allies were challenged to
disprove that the efficacy of utilitarianism justified state torture. In
prosecuting Dr. Karl Brandt, Germany’s Reich Commissioner for Sanitation
and Health, the Allies called as a witness Professor and ethicist Werner
Leibbrandt. Brandt was accused of crimes against humanity for his
participation in euthanizing “useless eaters” (aged, insane, incurably ill and
deformed children), as well as authorizing medical experiments on the
incarcerated.331
The German medical experiments, conducted on concentration camp
victims, served the state’s interests in acquiring knowledge to better provide
for the safety of its soldiers and “valued” citizens. For example,
concentration camp victims were subjected to altitude experiments to the
point of death in order to inform the Luftwaffe, Germany’s air force, of the
safe ceiling for its aircraft and how to safely exceed those limits. Researchers
had exhausted animal experimentation and the German government gave
authority to initiate the research on inmates.332
Brandt, represented by German lawyer Robert Servatius, argued his
innocence since his conduct was fully authorized by the laws of Germany at
the time he participated in the “mercy killings” and authorized medical
experiments—Germany’s positive law endorsed Dr. Brandt’s actions. The
briefs filed by Brandt and the other doctors on trial, cited Buck v. Bell in
support of this position.333
330. Dr. C. G. Campbell, “The German Racial Policy,” XXI EUGENICAL NEWS, No. 2
(Mar.-Apr. 1936).
331. VOLUME II TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NURENBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS
UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10 (1949) [hereinafter Nuremberg Transcript]
(transcripts of the Nuremberg Medical Trial)(Nuremberg misspelled in the original). See also
Karl Brandt, JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBRARY, www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/karl-brandt.
332. Eugenics in the United States took a similar path with its earliest expressions found
in the forced sterilization of Indiana inmates initiated by Dr. Harry Clay Sharp. Indiana
became the first state to pass legislation authorizing forcible sterilization of persons
exhibiting “defective” traits undesired by the state and Sharp used his influence in the
American Medical Association to attract adherents who influenced 29 more states to follow
ARCHIVE,
suit.
See
e.g.,
Sterilization
Laws,
EUGENICS
www.eugenicsarchive.org/html/eugenics/static/themes/3.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2018).
333. See, e.g., Influence of Virginia’s Eugenical Sterilization Act, U. OF VA. HIST.
COLLECTIONS, http://exhibits.hsl.virginia.edu/eugenics/4-influence/ (last visited Apr. 17,
2018);
see
also
Nuremberg
Documents,
THE
READING
ROOM
(2009),
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/buckvbell/45/.
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Servatius, however, knew that the “justice-apt” nature of law compelled a
moral justification for Germany’s law and Servatius knew the radical
equality of Christianity that enshrined human dignity in law was the enemy
of this effort.334
Accordingly, Servatius attempted to justify his legal positivism with a
utilitarian moral justification during his cross examination of Professor
Leibbrandt. His colloquy with Professor Leibbrandt reveals the danger
utilitarianism poses to the individual and the folly of science ruling human
conscience.
Dr. Servatius: Witness, you stated that the performance of
experiments on human beings, as is the subject of the indictment
334. The concept of human “dignity” appears in a United States Supreme Court decision
as early as 1793 in the case of Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793). There Justice Wilson
wrote that “[m]an, fearfully and wonderfully made, is the workmanship of his all perfect
Creator: A State; useful and valuable as the contrivance is, is the inferior contrivance of man;
and from his native dignity derives all its acquired importance.” Id., at 455 (citations
omitted). Emmanuel Kant, recognizing the intrinsic value of the individual, formulated the
concept of “categorical imperatives”, absolute unconditional requirements dictated by moral
reasoning; such that one acts according to the maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will
that it should be an universal law. Kant, supra note 75. Kant applied such an imperative to
our relationships to each other stating: “Now I say that the human being, and in general
every rational being, exists as end in itself, not merely as means to the discretionary use of
this or that will . . . . The practical imperative will thus be the following: Act so that you use
humanity, as much in your own person as in the person of every other, always at the same
time as an end never merely as a means.” Id., at 45-47. In other words, Kant’s exercise of
reason led him to Jesus Christ’s formulation of the Golden Rule. Human dignity, or the
stamp of God’s image, requires that each individual be treated as an end, not a means. This
logically requires utilitarian punishments to be limited by recognizing the intrinsic value of
both the victim and the offender. Without such limits both are merely considered means for
state objectives. Herein lies the error, when the United States Supreme Court allows, through
legislative deference, utilitarian penological interests to justify punishment thereby violating
human dignity, the preservation of which was the primary aim of the Eighth Amendment.
Only proportional retributive punishment is constrained by and formulated in recognition
of the dignity of both the offender and victim. For this reason, a plurality of the United States
Supreme Court acknowledged “the basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is
nothing less than the dignity of man” when applying a proportionality test to punishment.
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958)(Warren, C.J., joined by Black, Douglas, and
Whittaker, JJ.). After WWII, and the world’s awakening to the atrocities perpetrated by Nazi
Germany, “the concept of dignity gained significant traction, and, today, references to
dignity can be found in national constitutions and international treaties around the globe.”
Meghan J. Ryan, Taking Dignity Seriously: Excavating the Backdrop of the Eighth
Amendment, U. ILL. L. REV. 2129, 2132 (2016). Yet the world’s courts and commentators
struggle with defining dignity absent the metaphysical concepts of intrinsic value and justice.
Dignity is only reflected through faith that just or proportional punishment aids in
restoration of “right relationship” and because it is just, is the only right thing to do.
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here, can be ascribed to biological thought. What do you mean
by biological thought?
Witness Leibbrandt: By biological thought I mean the attitude of
a physician who does not take the subject (the individual on
whom the experiment is being performed) into consideration at
all, but for whom the patient has become a mere object, so that
the human relationship no longer exists, and a man becomes a
mere object like a mail package . . . . [T]he physician is not
merely a biologist. . . . Primarily . . . [the] physician is a man who
assists the human being and not a scientific judge of biological
events.
Q: Could there not be other causes for the experiments, such as a
collective state thinking?
A: Yes.
....
Q: But in your opinion, Professor, how should a doctor work in
the interest of suffering humanity in cases where . . . there is no
possibility of experiments on animals?
A: [I]t is part of a physician’s morals to restrain his urge for
natural research in favor of the basic medical attitude as laid
down in the oath of Hippocrates, namely, to cause no arbitrary
harm to his patient . . . [t]he concept of humanity is a very
dangerous concept. It is most dangerous of all for the
physician . . . . For the physician, the individual stands above all
humanity and the individual unfortunately has sunk very low in
these last few years.335
Science and materialism assist in discovering what “is” but must not
dictate what “ought” to be. Dr. Karl Brandt was executed on June 2, 1948.336

335. Nuremberg Transcript, supra note 330, at 80-81.
336. The 2010 federal census reveals that more African-American males, aged 19-24,
were in prison than employed. Twenty-six percent were incarcerated and only 19%
employed. George Gao, Chart of the Week: The black-white gap in incarceration rates, PEW
RESEARCH (July 18, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/07/18/chart-of-theweek-the-black-white-gap-in-incarceration-rates/. This fact is stunning, morally compelling
and cannot stand. Much of the increase in U.S. incarceration rates have been attributed to
enhanced punishment for drug use which, in turn, has disproportionately impacted AfricanAmerican males. See Derek Neal & Armin Rick, The Prison Boom & Lack of Black Progress
After Smith & Welch, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RES. (July 2014),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w20283. Prison for addiction should be questioned. It is
inconsistent with limiting punishment to just deserts in that the punishment is
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The human condition abhors the moral vacuum of scientific materialism
just as it protests the moral vacuum of legal positivism. For this reason, legal
positivists have struggled for more than a century to explain why morality is
not a necessity in defining law but is still relevant to discussing law.337
Wishing to avoid moral discussion does not make morality cease or render
its consideration irrelevant,338 its power remains.
Yesterday upon the stair,
I met a man who wasn’t there.
He wasn’t there again today.
My gosh, I wish he’d go away.339
Although positivists often view metaphysics as “the effort of a blind man
in a dark room to find a black cat that isn’t there,”340 we still engage in the
search as reflected in the ontology of the language of jurisprudence.341 And
thank God, the thirst for justice has not disappeared.
But justice still struggles as consequentialism seeks to fill the moral void
of early legal positivism thereby eroding the radical individualism and
equality of the American Revolution.
Consequentialist aims, be it deterrence, rehabilitation, or incapacitation,
do not contain any inherent or defining limits on the ability of the state to

disproportional to the moral blameworthiness of the offender. The distribution of illegal
narcotics, however, is an altogether separate issue.
337. See generally Green, supra note 293, and citations therein.
338. Judge Richard Posner admits “nervousness” about issues of subjective intent and the
relation of those issues to metaphysical concepts yet, Posner admits the law is as orthodox
today as it was 100 years previous. See Quandary, supra note 36, at 27, 157: Richard Posner,
The Path Away from the Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1039, 1040-41 (1997). “[T]he history of
philosophy plainly shows that the problems facing the materialist . . . reside . . . in the
genuine difficulty of providing a plausible materialist account of consciousness and the
subjective dimension.” HOWARD ROBINSON, MATTER AND SENSE 1 (1982).
339. Quandary, supra note 36, at 25.
340. Id. at 3 (quoting Morris and Felix Cohen, READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL
PHILOSOPHY 665 (1st ed. 1951)). For another example of the tendency of modern
jurisprudence to discard the influence of metaphysics on law, see Rodney D. Chrisman, Can
a Merchant Please God?: The Church’s Historic Teaching on the Goodness of Just Commercial
Activity as a Foundational Principle of Commercial Law Jurisprudence, 6 LIBERTY U. L. REV.
453 (2012). Chrisman explains that the question “of whether a merchant can please
God . . . was central to the consideration of commercial law during the period when the
Western legal tradition, Western commercial law, and the institutions therein, were being
formed.” Id., at 454-55 (citations omitted).
341. See generally Quandary, supra note 36.
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restrict or punish the conduct of the individual.342 C.S. Lewis captured the
dilemma when addressing state claims of “rehabilitation” in his essay “The
Humanitarian Theory of Punishment.”343
My contention is that this doctrine, merciful though it appears,
really means that each one of us, from the moment he breaks the
law, is deprived of the rights of a human being . . . . The
Humanitarian theory removes from Punishment the concept of
Desert. But the concept of Desert is the only connecting link
between punishment and justice . . . . There is no sense in talking
about a ‘just deterrent’ or a ‘just cure.’344
Justice Scalia agrees. “[I]t becomes difficult even to speak intelligently of
‘proportionality,’ once deterrence and rehabilitation are given significant
weight. Proportionality is inherently a retributive concept, and perfect
proportionality is the talionic law.”345
When consequentialist theories claim such limits, the application of
these limits requires more faith than our ability to intuit what is just.
Neither Bentham’s hedonism346 nor professor and philosopher Peter
Singer’s preferences347 provide greater certainty or a more just result than
the everyday decisions of mothers who only punish as deserved, scilicet, the
mother who punishes her child’s theft of his siblings desert by requiring the

342. Except for the most recent individual liberty rationale-there “has been the almost
total lack of concern for identifying limitations upon the use of the criminal sanction except
those limitations that are thought to be required by the general purposes for which the
criminal sanction is employed.” Dubin, supra note 7, at 336. For example, Lady Barbara
Wootton of England, philosopher and social reformer, claimed “the whole doctrine of mens
rea and the conception of responsibility embodied in it is an irrational hinderance to sound
social policy [and the] doctrine should be eliminated.” H.L.A. Hart, Crime and Criminal Law
74 Yale L.J. 1325, 1325 (1965) (book review); see Richard Singer, The Resurgence of Mens
Rea: I – Provocation, Emotional Disturbance, and the Model Penal Code, 27 BOSTON COLL. L.
REv. 243, 244 (1986).
343. C. S. Lewis, The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment, 6 RES JUDICATAE 224 (1953),
http//www.angelfire.com/pro/lewiscs/humanitarian.html.
344. Id.
345. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 989 (1991).
346. See generally JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS
AND LEGISLATION (1789; republished Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907).
347. See Peter Singer, Taking Life: Humans, in PRACTICAL ETHICS 175-217 (2d ed. 1993).
Professor Singer argues for a utilitarian moral outcome determined by the majority
preferences of the enlightened.
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thief to provide restitution of his desert on the next dining occasion.348 As
Holmes wrote, even a dog knows the difference between being kicked and
tripped over.349 Providing only just, proportional punishment is an intuitive
exercise. Just as the conclusion that punishing the morally innocent is
grossly disproportional punishment is also intuitive. Deferring to legislative
efforts to discern what punishment will serve as sufficient deterrence for a
society of more than 300 million people, while also increasing general
happiness,350 is to invite the chaos and arbitrary application of criminal law
we have today. Yet, it is here that our jurisprudence places its’ faith and to
which we subjugate personal liberty, due to modern jurisprudential
aversion to metaphysical concepts.
And so by the mid-nineteenth century, the utilitarian interests of the
state, and its willingness to view individuals as a means to an end,
inseminated the new nation with the justification for punishing the
innocent through strict liability, or “public welfare” crimes.
Bentham advocated that the sole justification for the state to punish was
to maximize public welfare.351 This significantly broadens the justification
for punishment and removes consideration of the individual offender,
except to conform that person, if possible, to societal expectations. 352
Initially, this broadening of state justification manifested in narrowing the
available defenses for the accused.
348. The insistence by the legal positivist of empirical verification of all legal claims is
another effort to presuppose the irrelevance of metaphysics while demonstrating greater
faith than what is due in social science. See QUANDARY, supra note 36, at 14 (describing the
insistence as “naivete—pleasingly disguised . . . as tough-minded rigor”).
349. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 2 (1881).
350. Consequentialist theories regarding the state’s right to punish have experienced the
same evolution of legal positivism, an initial claim that justice and metaphysics aren’t
relevant slowing moving towards an acknowledgment of the relevance of justice without the
ability to justify its application. Prof. Markus Dubber provides an excellent description of
this process in The Right to Be Punished: Autonomy and Its Demise in Modern Penal Thought
published in 1998. See generally Dubber, supra note 36. Dubber’s account also reveals the
ontological failings of consequentialist justifications explained in Prof. Steven Smith’s book,
Law’s Quandary. See generally QUANDARY, supra note 36.
351. See Dubin, supra note 7, at 340.
352. Id. at 340-50. Hart criticized Bentham’s approach, arguing Bentham’s public welfare
justification would not allow defenses of excuse (duress or mistake of fact), stating it was
proper to also consider concepts such as “universal ideas of fairness or justice and the value
of individual liberty.” See Dubin, supra note 7, at 343. Utilitarian justification for
punishment, therefore, followed the same path as legal positivism—initially rejecting
metaphysical concepts and then struggling to acknowledge the need to consider metaphysics
while denying its legitimacy. To constrain the state, it was necessary for Hart to turn to
moral concepts. Id.
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There was a tendency to disregard the mental element in crimes
[and] definitions of the requisite mental states began to be
fictionalized . . . also proof required to establish certain requisite
mental states began to be fictionalized; conclusive presumptions
and objectively phrased reasonable man tests became controlling,
the actual state of mind of the accused notwithstanding.353
It was a short step to disregarding the subjective intent of the accused
altogether and to simply criminalize conduct perceived to be contrary to the
general welfare of the state.
Utilitarianism brutally assaults the individual. Its unit of measurement is
conjecture and its math savagely honest, for two is always greater than one.
The justification for “treating” Carrie Buck with institutionalization or
sterilization also existed for the innocent whose conduct unknowingly
violates state proscriptions. Buck had no control over her condition, her
alleged feeblemindedness,354 and neither do the insane, mistaken, or
ignorant. And, just as their innocence is known, so too is their burden to
the state.
“It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate
offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can
prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind.”355 Or, if
the unfit were not treated with sterilization, then they could be treated with
incarceration. Society’s challenges were now recognized as larger, and as
more compelling than protecting individual liberty.
And this milieu of scientism, positivism, determinism, and materialism
reached this zenith as the new nation experienced the Second Great
Awakening and soon after misguided Christian public zeal joined in an
unrelenting assault on individual liberty.356

353. BISHOP, CRIMINAL LAW SECTION 303a, 540 (9th ed. 1923).
354. Buck was of average intelligence and performed well academically. Her commitment
to the Virginia Colony for the Feebleminded was orchestrated to conceal a rape. See supra
notes 64-65 and citations therein.
355. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). Examination of Holmes’s opinion reveals the
reach of materialism and determinism in American jurisprudence in the early 20th century.
356. Christian faith informs me the jurisdiction of government is limited, humans are
flawed, and God values human agency and personality through His willingness to suffer to
restore us to a right and loving relationship with Him. This compels humility when judging
the conduct of others and a radical empathy that is a manifestation of love. Although I
strongly support Christian involvement in government, I also believe many of the demands
on government first initiated in the wake of the Second Great Awakening reveal the
inappropriate idolization of government often displayed by those not humbled by a belief in
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In 1799, America was booming and expanding. Manufacturing was
transforming small towns to cities, immigrants were pouring onto
America’s shores and migrants were moving beyond the Blue Ridge
Mountains into the western reaches of Virginia, Kentucky and Tennessee.
In 1803, Jefferson’s Louisiana Purchase doubled the size of the United
States. America’s population, estimated to be 2.5 million at the revolution,
would be over 7.2 million by 1810 and more than 17 million by 1840.
The nation’s religious leaders were worried. Thousands, untold millions
of immigrants had not been exposed to scripture. In Kentucky, for example,
life “was primitive in the extreme, and the pioneers lived hard lives, full of
danger, loneliness, and privation.”357 Some communities were godless and
lawless by design. The area of Logan County, Kentucky, was called “Rogue’s
Harbor” as refugees from the northeast fled justice. “It was a desperate state
of society,” lamented Methodist preacher Peter Cartwright. “Murderers,
horse-thieves, highway robbers, and counterfeiters fled there . . . and
actually formed a majority.”358 America’s rapid cultural, economic, and
industrial change was unsettling to the individual and families with “radical
transformation of agriculture and industry, rapid geographic expansion and
urbanization”359 creating “rootless individualists”360 desiring order and
structure. America’s religious leaders grew increasingly concerned with
evidence of Sabbath-breaking, the existence of slavery, loose sexual morals,
and the lack of temperance.
Then the spark of revival occurred. In June of 1800, Pastor James
McGready hosted five pastors and five-hundred congregants at a “camp
meeting” for several days in Red River, Kentucky. “On the final day ‘a
mighty effusion of [God’s] Spirit’ came upon the people” and the grounds
were strewn with those stricken with guilt and crying out for God’s mercy
and forgiveness.361
In late July, McGready held a camp meeting in Gasper River, Kentucky
attended by 8,000 where “[t]he power of God seemed to shake the whole

God and who view government as the pinnacle of all achievement. The full scope of this
critique awaits another paper.
357. The Return of the Spirit: The Second Great Awakening, CHRISTIANITY
TODAY/CHRISTIAN HISTORY (1989) [hereinafter The Return].
358. Id.
359. Geoffrey R. Stone, The Second Great Awakening: A Christian Nation, 26 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 1305, 1308 (2010) [hereinafter Stone].
360. PAUL E. JOHNSON, A SHOPKEEPER’S MILLENNIUM: SOCIETY AND REVIVALS IN
ROCHESTER NEW YORK 9 (1978).
361. See generally The Return, supra note 355.
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assembly . . . . No person seemed to wish to go home—hunger and sleep
seemed to affect nobody—eternal things were the vast concern.”362
The camp meetings continued, drawing 10,000 then 25,000 souls as
revival also swept the northeast, with Timothy Dwight, president of Yale
College. His leadership soon resulted in the conversion of 80 of Yale’s 160
students.363 In Virginia’s Hampden-Sydney College, sudden conversions
and reformed lives spread the awakening amongst several Virginia
counties.364
America was aflame with tens of thousands of souls saved and reformed.
Yet, the zeal of the Second Great Awakening soon turned its attention from
the salvation of souls to the shaping of a nation and its zeal outran its
reason, seeking government sanction and imposition of a purified culture
readying itself for the return of Jesus Christ.365
The vigor of new Christian converts and leaders joined the faith of the
positivists and consequentialists to demand government intervention in the
lives of its citizens. To prevent drunkenness was must ban alcohol. To
prevent disregard of God, we must prevent postal service on Sunday.
Government, rather than protecting individual liberty, though often flawed
in its exercise, became viewed as a means to create the perfect society.366
By the mid-nineteenth century, the absence of metaphysical
considerations removed the philosophical barrier of inherent individual
rights to the shaping of law and, for many Christians, the presence of
individual vices compelled the use of law to remove those vices. For both,
the answer was found in our nation’s legislative chambers.

362. Id.
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 328, at 1310.
366. I have always encouraged and supported persons of all faiths in their involvement in
government, and still do. Christian involvement in government is necessary and laudable.
Moreover, I reject the notion that a good public servant must leave his faith at the door. Our
faith, in whatever it is place, informs all of our decisions. A democratic republic demands
transparency, not conformity. To claim my faith in Jesus Christ does not inform my
decisions is either to lie about my faith and to conduct myself as if my faith in Jesus Christ
does not impact my conduct is to lie to myself. As flawed as I am, I attempt to do neither.
Yet, I do believe, many people of faith call for government to do too much and to do that
which it is not designed to do. This lack of consideration of the appropriate jurisdictions of
the church, government and the family are where the error lies, it does not lie in living our
faith.
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In contrast with England,367 whose strict liability crimes evolved
independently of America to plug a gap in privity, America’s first strict
liability laws were driven by the vices of prostitution, liquor, and Sabbath
breaking.368 In the early nineteenth century, America’s courts upheld the
common law requirement of mens rea. In 1816, Connecticut Supreme
Court reversed the conviction of a livery driver for violating a law
prohibiting the letting a carriage out for hire on Sunday, unless of necessity
or for charity.369 The accused claimed he honestly believed the hire was for
charity. “If . . . a man acts honestly . . . he is not a criminal [and to convict
him] would oppugn the maxim that a criminal intent is essential to
constitute a crime.”370
Thirty-one years later, things had changed. The same court, in Barnes v.
State,371 upheld the conviction and fine of $10 for selling liquor “to a
common drunkard.”372 Knowledge the purchaser was an alcoholic was
presumed and subjective intent deemed irrelevant.
The race was on. “Massachusetts decisions later became the fountain
head of the new ideas.”373 Convictions for selling intoxicating liquor were
upheld despite the seller’s ignorance their product was intoxicating or met
the definition of an “intoxicating liquor.”374
After 1868, writes Professor Sayre, the doctrine of “public welfare
crimes” became widely accepted in other states.375 This “movement also
synchronized with the trend of the day away from nineteenth century
individualism toward a new sense of the importance of collective interests.
The result was almost inevitable.”376

367. In England, strict liability crime was developed to address a gap in privity. Singer,
supra note 313, at 243.
368. See generally Sayre, supra note 82, at 56-62.
369. Myers v. State, 1 Conn. 502 (1816).
370. Id. at 504.
371. Barnes v. State, 19 Conn. 398 (1849).
372. Id.
373. Sayre, supra note 81, at 64.
374. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Boyton, 2 Allen 160 (Mass. 1861); Commonwealth v.
Goodman, 97 Mass. 117, 119 (1867).
375. Sayre, supra note 81, at 66. The growth of the modern regulatory state also
corresponds with Karl Marx’s publication of Das Kapital and the Communist Manifesto in
1848. Marx’s arguments claimed solutions to the perplexing problems faced by workers
swept up in the industrial revolution through the exercise of state power and coercion.
Marx’s justification for use of state power are often used today in support of the regulatory
state.
376. Sayre, supra note 81, at 67.
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V. CONCLUSION AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS.
The public welfare exception to the mens rea doctrine was viewed as
harmless at its inception. Courts limited it to crimes of meager fines of a
regulatory nature made necessary by the potential far-reaching harm to
society involving and involving mens rea proof issues rendering conviction
nearly impossible.
Moreover, originally courts indicated the doctrine would apply only to
cases with meager and non-odious punishment.
This is no longer the case. Strict liability crimes involve ruinous
punishments with lifelong odious repercussions and are enacted without
addressing concerns of proof, often by regulatory officials far removed from
the deliberative democratic process.
But the train can be stopped, the ship turned. The doctrine that
ignorance of the law is no excuse must be tossed aside. It was first
articulated by Blackstone through an error in interpretation377 and it is error
to apply it in the modern regulatory state.378 The breadth, reach, and
complexity of today’s criminal law renders knowledge of the law far beyond
the most learned person.379
If the concern is evidentiary, knowledge of the law can be treated as a
presumption, allowing the defendant the opportunity to present evidence in
rebuttal.380 Congress should pass a law requiring mens rea for every material
element of any federal crime and states can do likewise with state crimes.
And the Supreme Court should vigorously enforce the rule of lenity.381
Most importantly, the American public must demand that its
government perform its most basic function, protect the intrinsic and
inherent rights of its citizens, treating all as equal and presumed innocent
before the law and herein lies the greatest challenge. American’s greatest

377. Blackstone misinterpreted Roman law due to a mistranslation of Latin and thereby
mistakenly concluded Roman criminal law did not allow an ignorance of law defense.
Richard Singer & Douglas Husak, Of Innocence and Innocents: The Supreme Court and Mens
Rea Since Herbert Packer, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 859, 867 n.25 (1999).
378. See Folly, supra note 33. There were very few common law felonies and the first
federal criminal statute only had 30 felony offenses. Id. at 33 n.5.
379. For excellent and thorough support of this position, see Folly, supra note 33.
380. Folly, supra note 34. This would have been of great benefit to the Millses who
claimed their conduct was approved by state regulators. Evidence of that approval, however,
was excluded by the trial judge.
381. See Paul Larkin & John Michael Seibler, Turning the Rule of Lenity Into a Rule of
https://www.heritage.org/crime-andLenity, HERITAGE FOUND. (Nov. 17, 2015),
justice/report/turning-the-rule-lenity-rule-lenity.
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strength is it generally gets what it wants. And, American’s greatest
weakness is it generally gets what it wants.
And America’s idolization of government continues to increase. Driven
by fear and the nationalization of all issues by a national media, citizens
increasingly turn to government to solve all problems, and Congress and
the executive branch appease those demands, often, through new criminal
statutes. There is little concern about the innocent person punished by the
claimed solution as long as a solution can be touted and the citizenry
remains, except for immediate personal interests or passions, generally
distracted.
***
Years after his conviction, Ocie Mills received a phone call from
Quenton Wise who served on the jury that convicted Mr. Mills. Mr. Wise
related how the jury foreperson, whose son worked for the Corps of
Engineers, cajoled the jury to convict Mr. Mills.382 The foreperson argued a
conviction was necessary to “send an important message” and promised
other jurors that if convicted the Millses would receive a “slap on the
wrist.”383
Mr. Wise, not learned in law, exercised more wisdom than Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes when confronting the morally innocent individual
punished by the state. Rather than demeaning Mr. Mills due to an alleged
lack of utility to the state,384 or thanking Mr. Mills for being a “good soldier”
and suffering punishment as in innocent in the cause of deterring others,385
Mr. Wise apologized.386
Besides, Ocie Mills had already served his country as a good soldier, in
uniform, in the Korean War.

382. The Millses did not retain an attorney for their trial and the foreperson did not
reveal the potential conflict when the judge conducted voire dire. Author’s Interview supra
note 1; see also William F. Jasper, Victims of the Federal Bootprint, NEW AM. (Feb. 9, 2016),
www.thenewamerican.com/tech/environment/item/22498-victims-of-the-federal-bootprint.
383. Author Interview, supra note 1; see also New American, supra note 380.
384. See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927); see also supra note 70 (quoting Buck v. Bell,
274 U.S. 200 (1927)).
385. See Letter to Harold Laski, supra note 325.
386. See supra note 380 and accompanying citations.

